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ABSTRACT
Michael Lewiss recent book Flash Boys has resurrected the
controversy concerning high-frequency trading (HFT) in the
stock markets. While HFT has been important in the stock
markets for about a decade, and may have already peaked in
terms of its economic significance, it touched a nerve with a
public suspicious of financial institutions in the wake of the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. In reality, HFT is not one thing,
but a wide array of practices conducted by technologically adept
electronic traders. Some of these practices are benign, and some
even bring benefits such as liquidity and improved price
discovery to financial markets. On the other hand, there are
legitimate grounds for the commonly heard complaint that
HFT is not fair. Certain HFT practices such as co-location,
flash orders, and enriched data feeds create a two-tiered
financial marketplace, while other practices such as momentum
ignition, spoofing, and layering are merely high-tech versions of
traditional market manipulation. Finally, the creation of
special order types such as Hide Not Slide shows the
exchanges allowing their HFT clients to jump the queue of price-
time priority embedded in Regulation NMS and stock market
practice. While the commonly-used technique of a cost-benefit
analysis leads to equivocal or indeterminate results when
applied to HFT trading activity in complex and often opaque
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markets, a more basic ethic of fairness grounded in commonly
accepted rules of financial market behavior illustrates that
certain HFT practices are indeed unfair. This Article draws on
the legal, financial, and business ethics literatures to illustrate
exactly how certain forms of HFT are unfair, and proposes four
core principles to guide HFT activity and its regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Due mainly to the publication of Michael Lewiss Flash
Boys,1 the American public is once again concerned with the
question of the fairness of the financial marketplace. Lewiss
specific charge is that the stock market is a rigged2 game,
with high-frequency traders preying upon more traditional
Main Street investors and the institutional investors that
serve them. The allegation that the markets are rigged led to a
1. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: AWALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
2. See, e.g., id. at 40 (when protagonist Brad Katsuyama realizes he
cannot buy or sell stocks at the prices on the consolidated ticker feed, he
realized that the markets are rigged).
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swift denial by Mary Jo White, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Chair concerned with policing them.3 But in
the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and the slow recovery
from the Great Recession, the accusation that Wall Street
insiders were profiting at the general publics expense quickly
gained traction.4
SEC Chair White and other regulators have an important
role to play in fostering trust in the financial system. However,
a close look at a number of practices of the high frequency
traders and the exchanges that cater to them suggests the
markets are, if not rigged, subject to unfair and deceptive
practices carried out by some of the new high-frequency trading
(HFT) market makers. While the total profits extracted by HFT
are not great by Wall Street standards 5 and have been in
3. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch. Commn, Enhancing Our
Equity Market Structure, Address Before Sandler ONeill & Partners, L.P.
Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference (June 5, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.U7ta8_ldWS
q (stating that [a]ll of these market quality metrics show that the current
market structure is not fundamentally broken, let alone rigged after citing
data on the cost of executing large orders, market volatility, and bid-ask
spreads).
4. See, e.g., Harry Bruinius, Flash Boys Reignites Debate: Is High-
Frequency Trading a Digital Age Menace?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCEMONITOR (Apr.
2, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2014/0402/Flash-Boys-reignites-
debate-Is-high-frequency-trading-a-digital-age-menace; Stephen Gandel, Is the
SEC Protecting High-Frequency Traders?, FORTUNE (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/03/31/is-the-sec-protecting-high-frequency-traders/;
John Lanchester, Scalpers, Inc., 36 LONDON REV. BOOKS 79 (June 5, 2014),
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n11/john-lanchester/scalpers-inc; Matthew OBrien,
Everything You Need to Know About High-Frequency Trading, ATLANTIC (Apr.
11, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-high-frequency-trading/360411/. For a critical
appraisal of Lewiss book, see Felix Salmon, The Lewis Effect, SLATE: BOOK
REV., (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/business
/books/2014/04/michael_lewis_s_flash_boys_about_high_frequency_trading_re
viewed.html (arguing that the stock market has never been fair, and
transaction costs are far smaller than in the past). The controversy prompted
Senator Carl Levin, Chair of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to hold hearings on HFT. See Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss
of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014).
5. The Tabb Group estimates 2014 profits for HFT firms as
approximately $1.3 billion, down from an estimated $7.2 billion in 2009. See
Larry Tabb, No, Michael Lewis, the U.S. Equities Market Is Not Rigged, TABB
F. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/no-michael-lewis-the-us-
equities-market-is-not-rigged.
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decline in recent years,6 a number of characteristics of HFT
suggest they constitute, to some degree at least, a rent
extracted from long-term investors.7 The most successful HFT
firms experience little or no trading loss for years on end,8 and
the central plank used to justify their activities, that they
provide liquidity to the current computerized marketplace, is
subject to important qualifications.9 That said, the argument
that HFT is doing something wrong requires an ethics that
rejects caveat emptor as a guiding principle for financial
markets transactions. Since the most important structural
elements that enable HFT activityspecialized order types,
enriched data feeds, and co-location 10 are, at least in
principle, open for use by all, the exchanges and defenders of
HFT can argue there is nothing intrinsically wrong with their
conduct. The clash of perspectives results from the fact that,
practically speaking, only highly specialized and
6. See Matthew Philips, How the Robots Lost: High-Frequency Tradings
Rise and Fall, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESS (June 6, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-06-06/how-the-robots-lost-high-
frequency-tradings-rise-and-fall (HFT peaked in share volume in 2008-2011);
see also Donald MacKenzie, A Sociology of Algorithms: High-Frequency
Trading and the Shaping of Markets 2930 (June 2014) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/156298/Algorithms25.pdf
(noting that profits of HFT firms appear to have shrunk to approximately
1/20th of a cent per trade, although there are reasons to be skeptical of low
estimates of profitability). For an early discussion of the limitations of HFT,
see Richard Bookstaber, The Arms Race in High Frequency Trading, RICK
BOOKSTABER BLOG (Apr. 21, 2009), http://rick.bookstaber.com/2009/04/arms-
race-in-high-frequency-trading.html.
7. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
8. Dave Cummings, owner of Kansas City-based Tradebot, reportedly
told a group of business school students that his firm had not lost money on a
single day over a four-year period. See Stephen Gandel, Is KC Firm the New
King of Wall Street?, TIME (May 18, 2010), http://business.time.com/2010/05
/18/is-kc-firm-new-king-of-wall-street/. Similarly, Virtu Financial disclosed
that it had experienced only one day of trading losses over a five-year period.
See Sam Mamudi & Leslie Picker, Virtu Filing Shines Light on High-
Frequency Trading, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESS (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-11/virtu-filing-shines-light-
on-business-of-high-frequency-trading; cf. MacKenzie, supra note 6, at 30
(stating that one interviewee estimated that his firm profited on fifty-three
percent of its trades, typically for a one cent profit).
9. Liquidity provision and price discovery are the two most frequently
cited benefits HFT brings to the financial markets, and HFT firms appear to
provide significant liquidity to the stock markets. For a discussion of various
costs and benefits HFT brings to financial markets, see infra Section III.A.
10. See infra Part II for a detailed explanation of the varieties and specific
structural elements of HFT activity.
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technologically adept firms can take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the exchanges, and the trading
strategies they enable allow for, at least for some HFT firms,
the nearly risk-free extraction of profits at the expense of
slower traders. Furthermore, a number of the specialized order
types used by traders appear to have been specifically created
by the exchanges and HFT shops to allow technologically adept
players to prey upon slower, unaware traders.11
This Article aims to provide a closer look at the features of
HFT that have caused critics to complain that it is unfair.12 In
particular, it comes to the following conclusions:
11. The allegation that HFT firms and the exchanges colluded to create
techniques to enable HFT to profit at the expense of slower traders in the
market is one of the most disturbing charges leveled against HFT. See SCOTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE
RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET 20405 (2013) (High-speed firms
worked hand in hand with the trading networks to create exotic order types
that would behave in very specific ways.); accord LEWIS, supra note 1, at 163
(By giving HFT what it wanted (speed, in relation to the rest of the market;
complexity only HFT understood; and payment to brokers for their customers
orders, so that HFT had something to trade against), the new stock exchanges
had stolen market share from the old stock exchanges.); id. at 171 (explaining
that the purpose of the special order types was to create an edge for HFT at
the expense of investors); see also infra notes 26382 and accompanying text.
12. This Article aims to provide a detailed look at the potentially
objectionable practices of HFT with particular attention paid to fairness
issues. In doing so, it presents a considerably more negative overall evaluation
of HFT than earlier commentators in the legal literature. See, e.g., Charles
Korsmo, High Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV.
523, 528, 562 (2014) (hedging against criticism of HFT by stating that it has
generated an appearance of unfairness); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial
Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 595 (2014) (While actual and potential
challenges presented by cy-fi [cyber finance] are many, serious, and real, so
are its actual and potential benefits. (internal footnote omitted)); Mi Hyun
Yoon, Trading in a Flash: Implication of High-Frequency Trading for
Securities Regulators Worldwide, 24 EMORY INTL L. REV. 913, 943 (2010)
(arguing that the SEC should regulate only certain HFT strategies that create
systemic risk); Michael J. McGowan, Note, The Rise of Computerized High
Frequency Trading: Use and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., ¶ 31
(2010) (Despite these reservations, there is still evidence to suggest that HFT
benefits the markets and curbing its use would be to the detriment of all
investors.). More recent articles in the legal literature have cast a more
critical eye on HFT. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Laurence R. Glosten &
Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE
L.J. 191, 196 (2015) (proposing a tripartite framework of adverse selection,
principal-agent problems, and multiple venue trading to analyze HFT); Frank
Pasquale, Laws Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of High-
Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2087 (2015) (drawing on the
Legal Theory of Finance to argue that benefits from ever-faster trading may
be illusory); Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed
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 HFT, like many other financial market activities, is
complex, and the term encompasses an array of
specific practices. Some HFT activity is morally
objectionable, while other common HFT activities
are morally neutral or even beneficial.
 While the dollars at stake in HFT may be declining,
it is a symbolically important problem that
resonates with equity concerns of ordinary
Americans, particularly those who invest in the
financial markets through 401(k) and other types of
retirement plans. Regulators and financial markets
participants therefore ought to treat it carefully.
 An accurate evaluation of the fairness of a
marketplace activity cannot be understood from
quantitative measures alone, but requires
understanding the structural interaction of market
participants in terms of their expectations and
beliefs when entering into a transaction. This
perspective highlights a role for deontological moral
theory in financial regulation because a purely cost-
benefit analysis will often miss the internal
perspective of important stakeholders in the
system.
 The invasion, and now dominance, of the financial
markets by the information technology of the
digital age appears to undermine the grounding
assumptions of Regulation National Market System
(Regulation NMS or Reg. NMS). Regulation NMS
may come to be seen as an unstable and ultimately
unworkable regime between the world of the 1934
Act and what comes next as information travels at
the speed of light. In hindsight, warnings over the
danger of fragmentation during the debates on the
implementation of a national market system
appear prescient.
Pinging and Front-Running in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607,
61617 (2015) (arguing that high-speed pinging should be viewed as a
deceptive trading practice under the CEA); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic
Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607,
164457 (2015) (arguing that HFTs impact on prices harms the allocative
efficiency of the stock market).
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I. THE ECOSYSTEM OF THE EQUITY MARKETS
As with most other features of contemporary life, stock
market transactions have been radically changed by the
information technology revolution over the course of the past
twenty or so years. Less than ten years ago, significant trading
took place on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), but the implementation of Regulation NMS in 2007
quickly transformed the floor into little more than a backdrop
for television stories relating to the economy.13 The changes
forced by regulators were intended to benefit the average
investor, and the new rules succeeded in important ways.14 At
the same time, however, they created a significantly new
financial ecosystem in which abusive activity has thrived. The
interaction of Regulation NMS with a technological arms race
has given rise to equity markets that run the risk of becoming a
two-tiered system.
Over the course of the past twenty years, the stock
exchanges have been transformed from institutions that
primarily served their member-owners into for-profit
corporations serving the interests of shareholders. 15 At the
same time the corporate form they operated under changed, the
economic effects of the new regulatory structure transformed
their customer base. 16 Many broker-dealers went out of
business, and only six Designated Market Makers17 (DMMs)
13. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls:
The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP.
L. 865, 866 (2008).
14. See Steve Wunsch, HFT and the Computerization of Wall Street, Part
3: Eliminating the Middleman, TABB F. (July 31, 2013),
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/hft-and-the-computerization-of-wall-street-part-
3-eliminating-the-middleman.
15. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2593 (2006); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen OHara,
From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 563, 585 (2005) (As exchanges convert to become profit-seeking
firms . . . the gains of the few turn into profits of the corporation.). See
generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION
57276 (13th ed. 2015).
16. SeeMacey & OHara, supra note 15, at 581, 593.
17. These are Barclays Capital Inc.; Brendan E. Cryan & Co., LLC; IMC
Financial Markets; J. Streicher & Co., LLC; KCG; and Virtu Financial Capital
Markets, LLC. Market Model Overview, N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
www.nyse.com/market-model/overview (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). There are
also seven firms designated as Supplemental Liquidity Providers: Citadel
Securities LLC; Goldman, Sachs & Company; HRT Financial LLC; KCG
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serve the NYSE in the role formerly exercised by specialists on
the exchange.18 Instead of serving the interests of a relatively
large group of members holding seats on the exchange, who
were previously compensated for by large spreads, 19 the
business model now followed by the exchanges is predicated on
charging relatively small fees for numerous transactions and
selling the information about such transactions.20 In the new
environment where exchanges compete for fees, any market
participant bringing a large volume of trades to an exchange
will be a valuable and favored client.
A. THE PRE-REGULATION NMS LANDSCAPE
The history of the stock markets in the United States
stretches back to 1792, when stock trading was said to have
been organized under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street.21 The
Buttonwood Agreement was signed by twenty-four brokers.22
It specified that brokers would trade only amongst themselves,
with a minimum commission rate of 0.25%. 23 These two
features of trading on what became the New York Stock
Exchange formed the cornerstone of the trading system that
persisted until the twenty-first century.24 The New York Stock
Exchange grew in the twentieth century into the most
Americas LLC; Latour Trading, LLC; Tradebot Systems, Inc.; and Virtu
Financial BD LLC. Id.
18. See Ryan C. Fuhrmann, Decline of the Independent Broker-Dealer,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 6, 2013), http://www.investopedia.com
/articles/professionals/050613/decline-independent-brokerdealer.asp
(discussing how the estimated number of broker-dealers registered with
FINRA fell by nearly 10% between 2005 and 2010, a trend that has continued
over the past couple years).
19. See generallyMarkham & Harty, supra note 13 (describing the demise
of traditional exchange trading floors).
20. See Bruinius, supra note 4.
21. See CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 13 (1997); Stuart
Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 113, 115 (1998). See generally Hans R. Stoll, Electronic Trading in Stock
Markets, 20 J. ECON. PERSPS. 153, 153 (2006). For a history of the stock
markets and the SEC since the 1930s, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANDMODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed. 2003).
22. See Banner, supra note 21, at 115 n.3 (citing Peter Eisenstadt, How
the Buttonwood Tree Grew: The Making of a New York Stock Exchange
Legend, 19 PROSPECTS 75, 75 (1994)).
23. See Eisenstadt, supra note 22, at 77.
24. Cf. Banner, supra note 21, at 114 (chronicling the NYSEs growth
from its Buttonwood beginnings to the center of the American economy).
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important venue for stock trading in the United States.25 While
the exchange was open to often justified criticism that it
benefitted its members at the expense of the public, it did
present a predictable system for buying and selling equity in
public companies, and regulations under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) were to a large
degree effective in suppressing the worst abuses.26
Key aspects of trading stocks on an exchange in the pre-
Regulation NMS landscape included both the fact that trading
in a stock tended to gravitate to one venue and the relatively
high cost of trading. Trading was limited to broker-dealers
holding seats on the exchange, who traded in the context of the
specialist system. 27 In addition to the members who were
allowed to trade on behalf of their clients, specialists supported
trading in NYSE-listed stocks, with 482 individual specialists
at the New York Stock Exchange28 covering an average of
three to six stocks each day in the early 2000s.29 A specialist in
a companys stock had the obligation to support trading when
25. See Eisenstadt, supra note 22, at 75 ([B]etween 1865 and 1920 . . .
the exchange [NYSE] emerged as the dominant capital market in the world.).
26. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of
Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 337 (2006) ([E]mpirical
evidence plainly demonstrates great economic value from our relatively
stringent system of governmental securities regulation.); Steven A. Ramirez,
The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic
Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 684 (2014) ([The] original conception of
the federal securities laws ushered in an unprecedented era of financial
stability.). For the view that it is enforcement of law that has beneficial
effects for a market economy, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The
Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007) ([H]igher
enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of capital and
higher securities valuations.). See also Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe,
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence,
93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 22730 (2009) (arguing that public enforcement of
financial markets law is positively associated with deeper capital markets
than private enforcement). For a skeptical counterargument, see George J.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 153 (1973).
27. See generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES: MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 494513 (2003); SELIGMAN, supra note
21, at 33544 (describing the function and history of specialists); Gideon Saar,
Specialist Markets, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE (Rama
Cont ed. 2010); Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange
Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 DUKE L.J. 707, 70708
(1970) (discussing specialists roles and history).
28. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 496.
29. Id.
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liquidity dried up;30 about ten percent of trades were supported
by specialists either purchasing or selling stock.31 And while
specialists could see the orders in the order book, and thus
had knowledge of where the market was headed, 32 front-
running in stocks was forbidden.33 In the open outcry auction
system, trading occurred at the post on the floor of the
exchange where a specialist was located, with brokers shouting
bids or offers to one another.34 In the classic twentieth century
form of the exchange, trading gravitated to the exchange
because brokers wanted access to the greatest trading
volume.35 In this way, stock exchanges held onto the vast bulk
of the trading in stocks listed on their exchanges.36
The other central economic feature was the cost of trading.
Since stocks were listed in 1/8th of a dollar increments, spreads
30. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1(a)(2)(ii) (2015) (outlining the role
of specialists in the stock market). Specialists, however, had a certain amount
of discretion in meeting this obligation. SeeWolfson & Russo, supra note 27, at
71112.
31. See Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild & Harold D. Fletcher, The NYSE
Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failure of Self-
Regulation, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 102, 107 n.20 (2010).
32. See Gerald T. Nowak, Note, A Failure of Communication: An
Argument for the Closing of the NYSE Floor, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 485,
50102 (1993) (presenting the economic benefits accorded to specialists).
33. Front-running by specialists was a common practice in the years
before the Exchange Act. See GEISST, supra note 21, at 213 ([S]pecialists were
in a privileged position to see prices before executing for the public and would
often act for themselves before filling an order from the public being executed
through a floor broker.). Although front-running is not explicitly prohibited
by the federal securities laws, the rules of the various exchanges and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) forbid it and it is
prosecuted as a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See Fox et al.,
supra note 12, at 227 n.87; David M. Bovi, Rule 10b-5 Liability for Front
Running: Adding a New Dimension to the Money Game, 7 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 103, 11114 (1994). For discussion of front-running and other misconduct
by specialists, see Ellis et al., supra note 31, at 11517 (describing front-
running as well as other forms of specialist misconduct). For an analysis of the
specialist system, see Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange
as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo
Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 102534 (1990).
34. See Leo Melamed, The Mechanics of a Commodity Futures Exchange:
A Critique of Automation of the Transaction Process, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149
(1977) (presenting an overview and defense of open outcry trading).
35. See Craig Pirrong, Competition and Vertical Integration in Financial
Exchanges, 7 COMPETITION POLY INTL 90, 93 (2011) [hereinafter Pirrong,
Competition and Vertical Integration] (explaining the liquidity network effect
for exchanges).
36. See id. at 94 (reporting that the NYSEs market share plunged from
85% to approximately 30% after the introduction of Reg. NMS in 2007).
2016] HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 81
on stock trades were a minimum of 12.5 cents, with 25 cents
being most common and 50 cents or more also possible.37 The
fixed prices in 1/8th increments preserved fat profits for market
makers, as their compensation for making a trade was the
spread between the bid and the ask, or the prices a broker
would pay and sell for a stock, respectively.38 While these high
costs represented a significant rent extracted from the brokers
clients, they were also transparent, 39 in distinction to the
present markets. In addition to spreads, stockbrokers
traditionally charged high fixed commissions to clients,
although fixed commissions were dealt a deathblow with the
amendments made to the Exchange Act in 1975.40 Despite this
transparency, the cost of trading was a central motive for the
implementation of a National Market System that began with
the enabling legislation in 1975 and finally led to the
promulgation of Regulation NMS in 2005.41
The gravitation of trading to exchanges on which stocks
were listed and the high transaction costs charged to customers
were two main features of the pre-Regulation NMS trading
environment. In hindsight, it appears that for investors the
37. See Stoll, supra note 21, at 160, 164.
38. See DIV. OF MKT. REG., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, MARKET 2000: AN
EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IV-9 (1994)
[hereinafter MARKET 2000] ([M]arket makers benefit because they can affect
executions at wider spreads than if a smaller variation was used.); see also
infra notes 5455 and accompanying text.
39. See id. at 17, IV-1.
40. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Chinese Walls, and
Brokerage Commissions: The Origins of Modern Regulation of Information
Flows in Securities Markets, 4 J.L. ECON. & POLY 311, 324 n.62 (2008). The
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 prohibited fixed commissions on the
stock exchanges. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4,
89 Stat. 97, 10709; see also SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 47386 (The
practical effect of the Commission[s] decision . . . was to add to the already
considerable pressures to unfix commission rates totally.).
41. See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC:
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 322
(1985) (noting the objectives behind the national market system legislation
were to assure economically efficient securities transactions; fair competition
between brokers and dealers, and between exchanges and markets; the
availability of information; the execution of investors orders in the best
market; and an opportunity to execute orders without the participation of
dealers, which reflect Exchange Act § 11A); see also Regulation NMS, 70
Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,497 (June 29, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) ([T]he
NMS is designed to achieve the objectives of efficient, competitive, fair, and
orderly markets that are in the public interest and protect investors.);
SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 51114.
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former aspect was on the whole beneficial42 while the latter
was largely detrimental.43 (Of course, other parties within the
system, such as stockbrokers, would have different views.44)
While many market participants and scholars were concerned
about the dangers of fragmentation as a result of the effort to
introduce competition in the market system, whether or not
such fragmentation would occur, and its effect if it did, was the
subject of intense debate.45 In retrospect, the push to reform
the market system that began in the 1960s and 1970s, in
conjunction with the rise of computer technology, led to the
current, highly fragmented state of the markets with other,
new dysfunctions.46
In the pre-Regulation NMS period, stock markets were for
the most part auction markets run on an open outcry
system.47 In this format, transactions were driven by orders
conveyed to stockbrokers to either buy or sell.48 The National
42. Increased liquidity and price competition are the main benefits that
economic theory would predict follow from the liquidity network effect. See
Pirrong, Competition and Vertical Integration, supra note 35, at 93; Stephen
Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of
Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 15455 (1995) [hereinafter
Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges] (discussing natural
monopoly among commodities exchanges); see also Marco Pagano, Trading
Volume and Asset Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 255, 255 (1989). See generally
Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and
Price Variability, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 3 (1988) (examining forces that lead to
concentration of trades at certain periods of the day).
43. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
44. Different players in the market will have different ideas concerning
the ideal market structure. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 15, at 577; see also
Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,500 (noting that at points the interests of
short-term traders and long-term investors may diverge). See generally
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3597 (Jan. 14, 2010) (noting that it can be difficult
to reconcile the five objectives set forth by Congress in Exchange Act § 11A).
45. See, e.g., MARKET 2000, supra note 38, at III-2 (arguing that U.S.
equity markets as of 1994 were not fragmented to the point that price
discovery and liquidity have been affected adversely); Roberta S. Karmel,
Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of
Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 39295 (2002); Mark
Klock, The SECs New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market
Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753,
76064 (1999); Arthur Levitt, Dynamic Markets, Timeless Principles, 2000
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 911 (2000); Macey & Haddock, supra note 41, at 341
42 (characterizing fears over fragmentation as unwarranted).
46. Cf. Karmel, supra note 45, at 40405 (examining discussions,
proposals, and actual changes made through the 1960s and 1970s).
47. SeeMelamed, supra note 34, at 150.
48. See id.
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Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) system stands as an exception, which through its
influence on equity trading gave rise to the current stock
market ecosystem. NASDAQ represented a fundamentally new
mode of equity trading both in its use of technology and its
format.49 The National Association of Securities Dealers formed
NASDAQ to provide its members with a way to trade stocks
that would be difficult to list on the NYSE or other major
exchanges.50 These stocks were traditionally issued by smaller
start-ups, often technology ventures, that would have difficulty
meeting the NYSE listing requirements. 51 The NASDAQ
trading system differed from the NYSE and other stock
markets that used trading floors. It used a quote-driven
system, where brokers put up quotes to buy or sell stocks on an
electronic bulletin board, and waited for counterparties to
accept them. 52 It also incorporated the use of computer
technology, and so was the precursor to todays electronic
trading systems.53
For many years NASDAQ was similar to the NYSE in that
it preserved the ability of dealers to earn substantial
commissions through large spreads, but a regulatory change in
1996 represented a break in the bulwark protecting dealers
easy profits. In 1994, finance professors William Christie and
Paul Schultz published Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers
Avoid Odd Eighth Quotes?54 After surveying prices in heavily
49. See Korsmo, supra note 12, at 533 (noting that NASDAQ was first to
use computers to trade in 1971); Markham & Harty, supra note 13, at 899;
Peter Gomber, Björn Arndt, Marco Lutat & Tim Uhle, High Frequency
Trading 8 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858626.
50. SeeMarkham & Harty, supra note 13, at 877.
51. See Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market
System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 35 (1986)
(characterizing the origins of the NASDAQ system as real time pink sheets).
See generally Overview of NYSE Quantitative Initial Listing Standards,
NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/NYSE_Initial_Listing_Standard
s_Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (presenting general listing
requirements for the NYSE).
52. See Stoll, supra note 21, at 15960.
53. Id.
54. William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market
Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994) [hereinafter
Christie & Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers]; see also William G.
Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Did Nasdaq Market Makers Implicitly Collude?, 9
J. ECON. PERSPS. 199 (1995); Stoll, supra note 21, at 15960.
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traded NASDAQ stocks, they suggested that brokers colluded
to keep spreads wide through avoiding quotes in odd eighths,
favoring even eighth quotes instead.55 Their paper gave rise to
significant controversy, 56 and as a result, then SEC Chair
Arthur Levitt championed order handling rules, which required
dealers to include in their own quotations customer limit orders
improving on their own quotes.57 While prices were still quoted
in 1/8th increments, now a customers bid or offer could
improve on its brokers quote. 58 This investor-friendly
regulation was a step in the direction of taking control away
from the intermediaries in the system, the stockbrokers, and
giving it to the end-users, the investors.
B. REGULATION NMS
Regulation National Market System, which became
effective in 2007, has its genesis in Section 11A of the
Exchange Act, entitled National market system for securities;
securities information processors.59 Foreseeing the problems of
fragmented securities markets and the ability of technology to
help in overcoming them, Congress authorized the SEC to use
its authority under this chapter to facilitate the establishment
of a national market system for securities. 60 Given the
accelerating pace of change in the national securities markets,
particularly in the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s, this
regulatory project represented a difficult challenge for the
SEC.61 And given the developments since 2007 that came about
55. Christie & Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers, supra note 54,
at 183839.
56. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Market Place; U.S. Investigating Nasdaqs
Pricing Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994, at D1; William Power, Academics
Fan Flames of Nasdaq Fairness Debate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1995, at C1; The
Odd Couple Wins, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 70.
57. See Order Execution Obligations, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,732 (July 30, 1997)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (promulgating the order handling rules);
Robert L.D. Colby & Erik R. Sirri, Consolidation and Competition in the US
Equity Markets, 5 CAP. MKT. L.J. 169, 18385 (2010); see also Collusion in the
Stockmarket, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 89.
58. See Order Execution Obligations, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,732 (July 30, 1997)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (requiring market makers and exchange
specialists to publicly display certain customer limit orders).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2012).
60. Id. § 78k-1(a)(2).
61. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 242), represents the culmination of this process. The final release
was preceded by two proposed releases, Regulation NMS, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,424
(Dec. 27, 2004) and Regulation NMS, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126 (Mar. 9, 2004). For a
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largely in response to the new regulatory landscape, it is
tempting to see Regulation NMS as a failure. While the new
system certainly created opportunities for private actors to
game it, these problems, with which this Article is largely
concerned, should be understood as unintended consequences
of an attempt to foster competition among disparate securities
markets across the United States.62
Regulation NMS consists of Exchange Act Rules 600612.63
The key provisions were promulgated in 2005. They are Rule
611 (the Order Protection Rule),64 Rule 610 (the Access Rule),65
Rule 612 (the Sub-Penny Rule),66 and amendments to Rules
601 and 603 (the Market Data Rules). 67 These rules knit
together the many exchanges and trading venues in the United
States through the mechanism of a single price, the National
Best Bid and Offer68 (NBBO). They also set up a complicated
system of rules mandating the provision of quotes to the
market at large, and how brokers and others can interact in
this ecosystem. 69 While largely successful in its aims of
reducing spreads and fostering competition amongst
exchanges, the new regime also led to the creation of a highly
fragmented systemcontrary to its intentionsin which a
subset of traders can prey upon slower traders.70
critical history of the development of Regulation NMS, see Dale A. Oesterle,
Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate to
Facilitate a National Market System in Securities Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 613 (2005). See also SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 495534.
62. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,498 (The NMS is premised
on promoting fair competition among individual markets, while at the same
time assuring that all of these markets are linked together, through facilities
and rules, in a unified system that promotes interaction among the orders of
buyers and sellers in a particular NMS stock.).
63. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600.612 (2014); see Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at
37,496.
64. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,501.
65. Id. at 37,502.
66. Id. at 37,503.
67. Id.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(42) (National best bid and national best offer
means, with respect to quotations for an NMS security, the best bid and best
offer for such security that are calculated and disseminated on a current and
continuing basis by a plan processor pursuant to an effective national market
system plan . . . .).
69. See id. § 242.600(b)(11), (26)(29) for NMS Regulation definitions
relating to quotes.
70. See Craig Pirrong, Pick Your PoisonFragmentation or Market
Power? An Analysis of RegNMS, High Frequency Trading, and Securities
Market Structure, 26 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2014) [hereinafter Pirrong,
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The cornerstone of Regulation NMS is the Order Protection
Rule.71 This rule prevents trade-throughs,72 or trades on one
market at a price inferior to one available on another market.73
The rule requires that each trading center establish policies
and procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent trade-
throughs on that trading center of protected quotations in NMS
stocks, other than in the case of a specified exception.74 In this
way, orders are protected from being executed at a price
inferior to the NBBO. While there was concern that the Order
Protection Rule could conflict with the duty of best execution
by brokers, as large block orders could face difficulty in being
executed quickly, 75 execution at the best price was given
priority in constructing the national market system. 76 The
Order Protection Rule, therefore, is commensurate with the
general principle of price-time priority prevailing in the
markets.77 Price is the primary factor in determining whether a
trade will be made. When there is more than one quote at a
particular price, the time of submission is generally used as a
secondary factor. 78 The Intermarket Sweep Order (ISO)
exception to the prohibition against trade-throughs79 allows
brokers to execute large trades quickly in the markets at the
request of clients, where the desire for speed in executing the
transaction outweighs the desire to search for the best possible
price among different market centers.80 As explored further
Pick Your Poison] (characterizing Reg. NMS as leading to the current
fragmented market system).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611.
72. Id. § 242.600(b)(77) (Trade-through means the purchase or sale of an
NMS stock during regular trading hours, either as principle or agent, at a
price that is lower than a protected bid or higher than a protected offer.).
73. See id. § 242.611.
74. Id. § 242.611(a).
75. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,523 (June 29, 2005)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
76. Id. at 37,497.
77. Id. See generally HARRIS, supra note 27, at 11620 (Rule-Based
Order-Matching Systems).
78. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 117 (All order-matching markets use price
priority as their primary order precedence rule. . . . Markets use various
secondary precedence rules to rank orders based on their time of submission,
on their display status, and on their size.).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(b)(5). The Intermarket Sweep Order is defined
at 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(30).
80. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,523 (The Commission . . .
provided exceptions for intermarket sweep orders that respond[ed] to the need
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below, the ISO became an essential item in the toolkit of high-
frequency traders, but its origin lay in the desire of the SEC to
allow broker-dealers flexibility in meeting their best
execution obligations.81
The Access Rule82 provides for uniform access to quotes on
the various trading venues by restricting the price charged for
a quote to $0.003 per share83 and by forbidding market centers
from discriminating in access to quotes.84 These rules were
necessary because without equal access to quotes, requiring
brokers to execute at the NBBO would be futile if broker-
dealers and trading centers were unable to access those prices
fairly and efficiently.85 The Access Rule is important to HFT
for two very different reasons. First, it may play a supporting
role to other regulations that are implicated in the question of
whether the exchanges have in fact acted in a discriminatory
fashion in providing enriched data feeds and flash orders.86
While offering enriched data feeds and flash orders does not
appear to violate the provisions of the Access Rule, they may be
at odds with the general intention behind the rule, which was
to further the goal of fair and efficient access to quotations
primarily by prohibiting trading centers from unfairly
discriminating against non-members or non-subscribers who
access quotations through an exchange member or subscriber.87
of market participants to access multiple price levels simultaneously at
different trading centers.).
81. See infra Section II.F.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610 (Access to quotations).
83. Id. § 242.610(c)(1). Where the price of a protected quotation or other
quotation is less than $1.00, the fee or fees cannot exceed or accumulate to
more than 0.3% of the quotation price per share. Id. § 242.610(c)(2).
84. Id. § 242.610(a).
85. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,502.
86. The anti-discrimination principle of Rule 610(a) may be a supplement
to Rule 603(a)(2), which mandates that an exchange that distributes
information with respect to quotations for or transactions in an NMS stock to
a securities information processor . . . shall do so on terms that are not
unreasonably discriminatory. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2). On the other hand,
the unfair discrimination standard of Rule 610(a) will apply only to access to
quotations, not to the full panoply of services that markets generally provide
only to their members. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,540. For
discussion of the application of Regulation NMS to enriched data feeds and
other HFT practices, see John C. Coffee, Jr., High Frequency Trading Reform:
The Short Term and the Longer Term, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (July
21, 2014), http:// clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/07/21/high-frequency-
trading-reform-the-short-term-and-the-longer-term/. See also infra notes 240
41 and accompanying text.
87. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,539.
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Second, the Access Rules prohibition on locked and crossed
quotations creates an environment in which a number of
abusive practices of HFT thrive.88 Ironically, the prohibition
only arose because of the disorderly consequences of traders
attempting to capture liquidity rebates in the maker/taker
payment model used by the early electronic exchanges. 89 A
locked market occurs when bids and offers are posted at the
same price, whereas a crossed market is when a bid is posted
at a higher price than the current offer (or an offer at a lower
price than the current bid). 90 Locked and crossed markets
represent fundamentally irrational conditions, and markets
react by seizing up. 91 As a result, Regulation NMS bans
displaying quotes that lock or cross previously displayed quotes
in the interest of promoting fair and orderly markets and
market efficiency.92
Why do locks and crosses occur? The motive for posting
locking or crossing quotations in a maker/taker system is to
avoid being a taker of liquidity, and to instead be a maker of
liquidity. This is because liquidity takers are charged an access
fee for hitting a pre-existing order, while liquidity makers are
paid a rebate, typically two-thirds of the fee paid by the
liquidity taker.93 Unfortunately, banning locking and crossing
quotes only leads to a further problem: the development of
abusive order types such as Hide Not Slide which provide
traders with a means to overcome the ban on locking and
crossing quotes while simultaneously jumping the queue of
price-time priority embedded in market practice.94
Next, the Sub-Penny Rule prohibits quotes in prices less
than $0.01 for national market securities valued at more than
$1.00, and in prices less than $0.0001 for stocks valued at less
than $1.00.95 The main purpose of this rule was to protect the
88. See generally id. at 37,54648 (discussing locking and crossing
quotations).
89. For a discussion of maker/taker payment model, see infra notes 148
51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problem of locked and
crossed markets prior to the passage of Regulation NMS, see Ivy Schmerken,
Nasdaqs Battle over Locked Crossed Markets, WALL ST. & TECH., May 2003,
at 12, 1218.
90. See Schmerken, supra note 89, at 14.
91. Id.
92. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,547.
93. See Schmerken, supra note 89, at 1618.
94. See infra Section II.F, which discusses the Hide Not Slide order in
detail.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 242.612 (2014); Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,503.
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use of limit orders in the securities markets.96 A limit order is a
standing order to purchase or sell a certain amount of a given
security at a given price;97 the list of standing limit orders
forms the central limit order book of a market and constitutes
the available liquidity for a stock. 98 In the wake of the
conversion of quotes from 1/8ths to decimals, or
decimalization, which occurred in 2000, there was pressure
on the exchanges to allow quotes in fractions of a penny.99 This
inevitably led to the use of minute increments to jump ahead of
standing limit orders in a given market; a trader could jump
ahead of a bid for a given stock at $20.55, for example, by
bidding $20.551.100 Allowing such minute improvements on
prices would jeopardize the use of limit orders, threatening the
main mechanism for building deep liquidity in the markets.101
The Sub-Penny Rule therefore was designed to limit the
ability of a market participant to gain execution priority over a
competing limit order by stepping ahead by an economically
insignificant amount.102
Finally, Regulation NMS instituted Market Data Rules in
Rule 601103 and Rule 603104 that form the regulatory backdrop
for the information systems that disseminate the NBBO and
other information to market participants. 105 (Rules 602 and
604606 were left mostly unmodified by the final implementing
release.106) These rules provide for the contemporary version of
the consolidated tape 107 and serve the crucial function of
96. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,503.
97. See HARRIS, supra note 27, at 73 (A limit order is an instruction to
trade at the best price available, but only if it is no worse than the limit price
specified by the trader.).
98. See id. at 7578 (discussing the liquidity benefits of standing limit
orders).
99. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,55051.
100. See generally id. at 37,55152 (listing a variety of additional
problems caused by sub-penny quoting).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 37,551.
103. 17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2014) (governing the [d]issemination of
transaction reports and last sale data with respect to transactions in NMS
stocks).
104. Id. § 242.603 (governing the [d]istribution, consolidation, and display
of information with respect to quotations for and transactions in NMS
stocks).
105. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,503.
106. Id. at 37,570.
107. Consolidated Tape, SEC. & EXCH. COMMN,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/consolt.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2012) (The
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disseminating a single NBBO for all exchange-listed stocks.
They are also crucial for any questions of fairness surrounding
dissemination of various types of information concerning
quotes, as Rule 603 specifies that any exclusive
processor[ 108 ] . . . distribut[ing] information with respect to
quotations . . . in an NMS stock to a securities information
processor[(SIP) 109 ] shall do so on terms that are fair and
reasonable. 110 Furthermore, [a]ny national securities
exchange, national securities association, broker, or dealer that
distributes information with respect to quotations for or
transactions in an NMS stock . . . shall do so on terms that are
not unreasonably discriminatory.111 The invocation of equity
in these rules is especially important to debates concerning the
provision of information by the exchanges and other venues to
HFT firms outside the mechanism of a SIP.112
There are currently four consolidated information
dissemination systems inheriting the role of the consolidated
tape: The Consolidated Quotation System, the Consolidated
Tape System, the NASDAQ System, and the OPRA System.113
These four entities qualify as SIPs under Regulation NMS, and
each must disseminate data to the market in accordance with
its Transaction Reporting Plan.114 The SIPs are crucial nodes
in the National Market System because they are meant to be
the entities that disseminate the NBBO to market participants
at large.115 The SIPs are responsible for providing each NMS
consolidated tape is a high-speed, electronic system that reports the latest
price and volume data on sales of exchange-listed stocks.).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22)(B) (2014) (defining exclusive processor).
109. Id. § 78c(a)(22)(A) (defining securities information processor).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(1) (2015).
111. Id. § 242.603(a)(2).
112. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 86; Fox et al., supra note 12, at 27071;
see also infra notes 23840 and accompanying text.
113. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, at 37,503 n.40, 37,571 (June 29,
2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); see Oesterle, supra note 61, at 621, 630;
see also Collection and Dissemination of Transaction Reports and Last Sale
Data, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,377 (Feb. 26, 1980).
114. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,571; see also 17 C.F.R. §
242.600(82) (2015) (Transaction reporting plan means any plan for collecting,
processing, making available or disseminating transaction reports with
respect to transactions in securities filed with the Commission pursuant to,
and meeting the requirements of, § 242.601.).
115. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,50304. For a discussion of
Congresss intent in providing for one or more SIPs in the 1975 Amendments,
see Oesterle, supra note 61, at 62426.
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security with core data116 consisting of (1) last sale reports
. . . ; (2) the current highest bid and lowest offer for the security
. . . ; and (3) the . . . NBBO.117
Rule 603(a)(1) requires that [a]ny exclusive processor, or
any broker or dealer with respect to information for which it is
the exclusive source, that distributes information with respect
to quotations for or transactions in an NMS stock to a
securities information processor shall do so on terms that are
fair and reasonable.118 This requirement is meant to allow a
SIP to gather the relevant data it requires. Rule 603(a)(2),
however, allows for exchanges and others to disseminate
information concerning quotes and transactions to other
market participants on terms that are not unreasonably
discriminatory.119 This implies a less stringent standard than
the one applicable to the requirement in 603(a)(1) that an
exclusive processor shall provide such information to a SIP.120
The dissemination of data by the exchanges through enriched
data feeds and other arrangements outside of dissemination to
the SIP falls under 603(a)(2), not under 603(a)(1). 121 The
question of the timing of the release of such data came up
during the promulgation of Regulation NMS. 122 The SEC
determined that an exchange could release data to market
participants simultaneously with its release of data to the SIP,
and was not required to do so in such a way as to synchronize
the delivery of its data to end-users with delivery of data by a
Network processor to end-users.123 This stance has obviously
116. While the term core data is not defined as such in Reg. NMS, it is
the data required by Reg. NMS to be submitted by a national securities
exchange or a national securities association to a SIP. See NetCoalition v.
SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at
37,567. It is a crucial concept for the functioning of Reg. NMS. NetCoalition
concerns the SECs approval of fees for non-core data charged to securities
traders by NYSE Arca. NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 52529. The Reg. NMS
Release allows prices charged for non-core data to be determined by market
forces, unlike the Reg. NMS regime that governs distribution of revenues from
market data. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,569.
117. See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 529.
118. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(1) (2015).
119. Id. § 242.603(a)(2).
120. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,56667.
121. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a).
122. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,56667.
123. Id. at 37,567.
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acquired far more relevance with the advent of HFT and the
marketing of private and enriched data feeds to HFT firms.124
Regulation NMS is an extensive set of very detailed
regulations meant to knit together the various trading venues
in the United States. While it has accomplished its goal of
forcing traders to compete in a national market through the
mechanism of the NBBO and the prohibition against trade-
throughs, it has been less successful in countering the
centrifugal forces at work among the growing field of trading
venues since its implementation in 2007. While all the blame
for the current problems in the equity trading environment
cannot be laid at the door of Regulation NMS, it is at the center
of the constellation of factors leading to the current situation,
which is characterized above all by a race for speed between
multiple trading venues.
C. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EQUITYMARKETS
In the nine years since Regulation NMS came into force,
the pace of technological change rapidly advanced,
transforming the markets.125 While seven years earlier, at the
turn of the century, the markets looked in many respects
similar to the markets of the 1960s or 1970s, just nine years
later they are radically different. Almost no stock is traded on a
trading floor any longer, and an estimated forty to sixty percent
of the volume on the exchanges is due to HFT.126 Algorithmic-
assisted trading makes up much of the rest.127 In addition to
the IT revolution, the exchanges have converted from mutually-
owned associations into for-profit companies, transforming
their policy-making and ability to make quick changes.128 The
business model of the exchanges has likewise changed, with
their role as information providers supplementing their role as
124. See generally infra Section II.D.
125. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 359496 (Jan. 14, 2010); see
generally Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moores Law Versus Murphys
Law: Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 51, 5153
(2013).
126. Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 59; see also GARY SHORTER & RENA
S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43608, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
BACKGROUND, CONCERNS, AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 1314 (2014)
(describing market share held by HFT in recent years).
127. Cf. SHORTER &MILLER, supra note 126, at 5.
128. See id. at 15.
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venues for trading.129 And trading venues have proliferated,
particularly among the unlit fora of dark pools, with thirteen
exchanges and over forty dark pools and other alternative
trading systems (ATS). 130 Along with the fragmentation of
trading venues has come a rise in technologically-induced flash
crashes and other market disruptions. Finally, the growing
complexity of the marketplace, combined with questions about
the quality of liquidity and availability of many quotes posted,
caused observers to ask whether the old exchanges have merely
been replaced by electronic markets of questionable reliability
and numerous hidden costs.131
The demutualization of the exchanges began in 1993 with
the Stockholm Stock Exchange.132 After that point, a wave of
demutualizations occurred, including that of the London Stock
Exchange in 2000. 133 The most important American
demutualization, however, did not take place until 2006 when
the NYSE converted from a member-owned corporation to a
corporation.134 In the conversion, owners of the 1,366 seats on
the NYSE received 80,177 shares of NYSE Group stock plus
$300,000 in cash and another $70,571 in dividends . . . . [T]he
deal valued each seat at approximately $5.5 million. 135
Proponents of demutualization argued that a corporate
structure would prove far more effective in dealing with the
129. See id. (noting for-profit trading centers responding to market demand
by offering direct connections to their trade data transmissions).
130. See id. at 8.
131. See, e.g., SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW
HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE
DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 47 (2012); LEWIS,
supra note 1, at 2355 (Brads Problem); PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 281
96 (A Rigged Game); MacKenzie, supra note 6, at 67; Alice K. Ross et al.,
Robot Wars: How High Frequency Trading Changed Global Markets, BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/16/robot-wars-how-high-
frequency-trading-changed-global-markets.
132. See Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of
Stock Exchanges, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105 (2002).
133. See id. at 106 tbl.1.
134. The NYSE was a member-owned, non-profit corporation from 1971
until 2006. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock
Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 355, 385 (2007).
135. Associated Press, NYSE Stock Surges in First Day of Trading, NBC
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11725095/38189133#.VkyT-
N-rR0s. See generally Aaron Lucchetti, A Big Exchange: NYSE Members
Approve Deal; Vote Overwhelmingly Endorses Archipelago Plan, Public
Listing; Closing In on End of an Era, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2005, at C1.
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challenges of running a complex financial services business
than a cumbersome member-owned cooperative. 136 In
particular, a chief executive officer with a board of directors
presented a far more efficient decision-making body than a
member-owned cooperative, where groups of members had
effective veto power over proposed changes.137
In the years before and after demutualization, there was
significant academic controversy surrounding the changes in
the legal structure of the exchanges. While some, such as
Professor Paul Mahoney, argued that as self-regulatory
organizations the exchanges could effectively serve the
investing publics interests,138 others, such as Professors Macey
and OHara, pointed out that under a Coasian analysis for-
profit corporate exchanges were an uneasy fit with the
prevailing regulatory structure governing the exchanges. 139
Macey and OHaras argument that exchanges as corporations
in the current regulatory context would likely fail to self-
regulate, as regulation was a public good subject to significant
136. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange:
Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1069, 1132 (2005); Fleckner, supra note 15, at 257677; Benn Steil,
Changes in the Ownership and Governance of Securities Exchanges: Causes
and Consequences, 2002 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVS. 61, 68
71; cf. Ruben Lee, Corporatisation of Exchanges and Central Counterparties:
The Dark Side Will Come, in COMPAQ HANDBOOK OF WORLD STOCK,
DERIVATIVE & COMMODITY EXCHANGES xxxix, xl (2002) (arguing that
[e]xchange managements are . . . likely to take excessive risks).
137. See generally Steil, supra note 136, at 69, 81 (presenting various
options for the organizational structure of exchanges).
138. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453,
145356 (1997); see also Jake Keaveny, In Defense of Market Self-Regulation,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2005); Karmel, supra note 45, at 409 (Current
Governance Structures and the Future of Self-Regulation.). Intellectual
support for Mahoneys self-regulation argument is found in Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a
Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997) and Daniel R.
Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common
Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987).
139. Macey & OHara, supra note 15, at 56366. Macey & OHaras
argument relies on Coases distinction between transaction costs and agency
costs to argue that the reduction in transaction costs of trading securities
increases the level of competition between trading venues, which in turn
reduces the efficacy of self-regulation on the part of the exchanges. See id. at
565; see also Coffee, supra note 86 (With the privatization of securities
markets, markets are no longer self regulators in any meaningful sense, but
instead are aggressive profit maximizers.). For an economic analysis of
problems with self-regulation at the commodity exchanges, see Pirrong, The
Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges, supra note 42.
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free rider problems, was prescient. 140 Nevertheless,
demutualization proceeded and was complete among the
worlds major stock trading venues by 2006.141
In addition to the introduction of Regulation NMS and
demutualization, technological developments also had a
transformational effect on the exchanges. Scott Pattersons
Dark Pools: The Rise of the Machine Traders and the Rigging of
the U.S. Stock Market tells the story of the rise of HFT.142
Computerized trading was pioneered in the 1990s by Josh
Levine at Datek Securities,143 who wrote computer programs
that would trade on NASDAQ quotes posted on the small-order
entry system (SOES) by NASDAQ market makers.144 These
quotes were posted on the electronic bulletin board operated by
NASDAQ and left overnight, or simply became stale in light of
information emerging from other venues.145 Levines programs
traded on the discrepancy between SOES quotes and other
prices, enabling the SOES bandits at Datek Securities to
profit handsomely.146 Dateks operations gave rise to the Island
trading network, an electronic communication network (ECN)
that competed with Instinet for market share in NASDAQ
stocks. 147 Island also revolutionized how both traders and
exchanges profited from their activities. In order to attract
140. SeeMacey & OHara, supra note 15, at 576.
141. See Aggarwal, supra note 132, at 106.
142. PATTERSON, supra note 11.
143. See generally id. at 67230.
144. While the NASDAQ was formed to provide for electronic, screen-based
dissemination of quotes, trades were still conducted over the phone. See Meeta
Kothare & Paul A. Laux, Trading Costs and the Trading Systems for Nasdaq
Stocks, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 42, 43 (1995). NASDAQ introduced the SOES in
1984 in order to allow for automatic execution of small orders of up to 500
shares of certain NASDAQ-listed stocks. Id. In response to criticism that
NASDAQ dealers failed to execute trades at posted prices during the stock
market crash of October 19, 1987, NASDAQ expanded the share limit for
small orders to 1,000 shares. Id. at 44. The SOES was subject to vociferous
criticism by dealers because it exposed them to more nimble traders who could
pick off its stale quotes. See id. These nimble traders became known as the
SOES bandits. See Chuck Epstein, SOES Storefronts, WALL ST. & TECH.,
Sept. 1997, at 48, 4849.
145. See generally Kothare & Laux, supra note 144, at 4546.
146. See PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 8999; Jeffrey H. Harris & Paul H.
Schultz, The Trading Profits of SOES Bandits, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 3940
(1997).
147. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 11624; Rebecca Buckman, Island ECN
Raises Capital to Become a Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1999, at C1;
see also MacKenzie, supra note 6, at 3537 (discussing Island and its
relationship with the SOES bandits).
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order flow, Island was the first to institute what became known
as the maker/taker payment system.148 Instead of earning
commissions through spreads, which had collapsed in the wake
of decimalization,149 Island paid traders who supplied a quote
that was acted upon (i.e., the makers) and charged those who
took such a position (i.e., the takers).150 Island itself earned
money from this arrangement by keeping one-third of the fees
collected from the takers, while paying out two-thirds of the
fees as rebates to the makers.151
The current fragmented and unsettled state of the markets
is signaled by a handful of recent events connected with the
rise of computerized trading. In addition to Michael Lewiss
Flash Boys, the flash crash of May 6, 2010 and the failed
IPOs of BATS Global Markets and Virtu Financial Inc. brought
the current problems of the markets to widespread public
attention.152 The flash crash involved the loss of over $1 trillion
in market capitalization in less than an hour and then its
subsequent recovery by the ending of the trading day. 153
148. See PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 15760; Maureen OHara, High
Frequency Market Microstructure, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 262 (2015) (arguing
that the maker/taker fee structure is particularly attractive to HFT). Because
anyone hitting a quote has to pay a fee, and anyone posting a quote that is
hit receives a rebate, the maker/taker system creates a mismatch between the
quoted bid and ask spread and the actual, economic bid/ask spread. See
Lawrence Harris & Ethan Namvar, The Economics of Flash Orders and
Trading 3 (Jan. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953524.
149. Decimalization is the conversion of prices on an exchange from
1/8ths (typically) to dollars and cents. The exchanges voluntarily introduced
decimalization in April 2001 after Congress threatened to pass legislation
requiring prices in dollars and cents. See HARRIS, supra note 27, at 115. While
decimalization greatly reduced spreads on stocks, and therefore reduced the
transaction costs for investors, it also reduced the ability of retail stockbrokers
to earn profits, and is widely suspected of contributing to the reduction in
IPOs and the lack of liquidity for small and mid-cap stocks. Staff, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Commn, Report to Congress on Decimalization (July 2012). For an
overview of the regulatory history of the move to pricing in decimals as well as
current concerns, see id.
150. See PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 15760.
151. See id.
152. See generally Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 6067 (detailing five
incidents related to new vulnerabilities created or facilitated by algorithmic
trading).
153. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMN & SEC. & EXCH. COMMN,
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF 6 MAY 2010 (Sept. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter CFTC & SEC]; Edgar Ortega Barrales, Lessons from the Flash
Crash for the Regulation of High-Frequency Traders, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 1195, 1195 (2012); Ananth Madhavan, Exchange-Traded Funds,
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During this episode, believed to have been triggered by the sale
of 75,000 E-mini S&P 500 June 2010 stock index futures (worth
$4.1 billion), the algorithmic trading programs of a number of
firms went haywire and started a cascade of sell orders for
firms including Accenture and 3M, as well as certain stock
index exchange-traded funds. 154 While ultimately non-
consequential to the majority of market participants, some
retail and institutional investors did suffer serious losses.155
More generally, this episode alarmed observers as it presented
the specter of markets careening out of control due to computer
malfunctions.156 These and other incidents, such as the mini-
flash crashes of September 27, 2010,157 October 15, 2014,158
and many others, gave rise to calls for improved circuit
breakers to algorithmic trading in the event of a
malfunction.159 Other incidents that highlighted the dangers of
automated trading include the delayed IPO of Facebook and
the failed IPO of BATS Global Exchange; 160 the latter,
ironically, a major player in the HFT world.161 The Facebook
IPO stumbled due to delays in the processing of trades,162 and
Market Structure and the Flash Crash, FIN. ANALYSTS J., JulyAug. 2012, at
20, 20; Andrei A. Kirilenko, Albert S. Kyle, Mehrdad Samadi & Tugkan
Tuzun, The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an
Electronic Market 1 (Nov. 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686004.
154. See CFTC & SEC, supra note 153, at 8386 (describing the impact of
the Flash Crash on Accenture and 3M stock); Kirilenko et al., supra note 153,
at 5.
155. See Kirilenko et al., supra note 153, at 1 (Broad stock market indices
 the S&P 500, the Nasdaq 100, and the Russell 2000, collapsed and
rebounded with extraordinary velocity.); Madhavan, supra note 153, at 20
(Despite its short duration, the flash crash affected many market
participants.).
156. See Kirilenko et al., id.
157. See Graham Bowley, The Flash Crash, in Miniature, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2010, at B1.
158. Matt Egan, Market Freak Out: Stocks Rebound from Scary Plunge,
CNN MONEY (Oct. 15, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/15
/investing/stocks-markets-wall-street-correction/.
159. See Jacob Bunge & Brendan Conway, Regulators Hone Circuit-
Breaker Proposals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2011,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702048313045765970234376848
18; Demos Telis & Michael Mackenzie, US Exchanges Eye Harmonized Pause
Rules, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at 2. For the discussion of the circuit breaker
programs implemented after the May 6, 2010 crash, see CFTC & SEC, supra
note 153, at 7.
160. See Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 6365.
161. Id. at 64.
162. Id. at 6364.
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the BATS IPO failed on account of reactions of traders to initial
declines in prices that spurred further downward
momentum.163 And on August 1, 2012, the trading firm Knight
Capital nearly went bankrupt due to new software that
malfunctioned upon its introduction, leading to losses totaling
$457 million and Knights absorption into GETCO, a leading
Chicago-based HFT firm. 164 These incidents highlighted the
potentially dangerous state of the current equity markets,
where human judgment has been pushed aside by lightning-
fast algorithmic trading programs engaged in a battle of the
bots against their competitors.
II. PROBLEMATIC VARIETIES OF HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING
HFT is best defined as computer-assisted trading that
exploits incredibly small time differences to yield profits at
minimal risk to those employing it. 165 While this definition
captures most activities referred to as high frequency trading,
it should be remembered that HFT is not one thing and it
163. Id. at 6465.
164. Id. at 65.
165. A number of commentators have noted the difficulty in coming to a
precise definition of high-frequency trading. See, e.g., OHara, supra note
148, at 258 (High frequency trading is a misnomer, a seemingly precise term
used to describe a large and diverse set of activities and behaviors.); Gomber
et al., supra note 49 (Section 3, High Frequency Trading Definitions and
Related Concepts, and Appendix III, Academic and Regulatory Definitions of
High-Frequency Trading). The SEC offers a characteristic-based description
of HFT stating that high frequency trading . . . is relatively new and is not
yet clearly defined. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed.
Reg. 3594, 3606 (Jan. 14, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 242). The SEC then
goes on to specify five characteristics of firms engaged in HFT:
(1) the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated
computer programs for generating, routing, and executing orders;
(2) use of co-location services and individual data feeds offered by
exchanges and others to minimize network and other types of
latencies; (3) very short time-frames for establishing and
liquidating positions; (4) the submission of numerous orders that
are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5) ending the trading
day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying
significant, unhedged positions over-night).
Id.; see also David Easley, Marcos M. López de Prado & Maureen OHara, The
Volume Clock: Insights into the High-Frequency Paradigm, 39 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 19 (2012) (Todays high frequency markets are not the old low
frequency markets on steroids.).
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exists on a continuum with its parent, algorithmic trading.166
HFT refers to a wide variety of trading strategies, most of
which exploit minute timing differences or use information
technology to incorporate vast quantities of data into their
determinations far more quickly than any human could. 167
While a number of the most-publicized types of HFT present
serious fairness problems, HFT is no more intrinsically morally
problematic than taking a taxi instead of walking. As will be
shown in Part III, moral concerns arise if other market
participants are kept in the dark as to the activities of high
frequency traders, if exchanges cater to high frequency traders
at the expense of other investors, or if HFT creates an
intrinsically uneven playing field when other participants have
a legitimate expectation of parity of position. Part II presents
an overview of HFT that moves from its origins in algorithmic
trading to its progressively more problematic aspects.
A. THE ORIGINS OF HFT: ALGORITHMIC TRADING
HFT developed out of algorithmic trading techniques used
to implement sophisticated investment strategies. 168 The
earliest algorithmic strategies were first-generation index
funds, which bought and sold stocks to optimize an investors
portfolio in accordance with Markowitzs portfolio optimization
theory. 169 Kirilenko and Lo state that widespread use of
algorithmic trading began in 1975 when finance professor Barr
Rosenberg founded Barr Rosenberg Associates, an investment
advisory firm that calculated covariance matrices for U.S.
equities and provided clients with software enabling them to
trade on this information to achieve optimal portfolios.170 Using
algorithms in trading eliminated the need for human judgment,
which at any rate would be impossible in quantitative
strategies with thousands of variables or inputs. 171 Another
early instance was the equal-weighted index fund, which
required continual updating of its portfolio to maintain equal
166. See generally Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 52 (describing the
historical relationship between algorithmic trading and HFT).
167. See id. at 5859.
168. See id. at 5160 for an overview of this development.
169. See generally id. at 5556.
170. Id. at 55.
171. See id. at 67; Stoll, supra note 21, at 153.
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dollar amounts of equities. 172 In these early forms of
algorithmic trading, human judgments concerning individual
stock transactions were set aside in favor of quantitative
strategies taking hundreds and even thousands of variables
into account. 173 Algorithmic trading therefore represents a
technique to overcome the computational limitations of the
human mind and our limited human rationality.174
As both technology and financial economics progressed,
more sophisticated strategies employing algorithms came into
use. Arbitrage strategies based on the Black-Scholes/Merton
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and Mertons concept of
dynamic spanning enabled hedge funds and other traders to
exploit differences in payouts of various types of securities and
derivative financial instruments.175 While such strategies were
not riskless, as the case of Long Term Capital Management
showed, they often provided lucrative opportunities to
sophisticated traders.176 Other algorithmic trading strategies
included software used to engage in market-making activities
and automated order execution programs designed to carry out
large transactions in the most advantageous manner.177
These types of algorithmic trading do not seem
intrinsically morally problematic. Computerized trading
programs are used as a sort of mental prosthetic that
overcomes the failings of human rationality.178 Our cognitive
abilities are relatively limited. A human trader can only
incorporate a small amount of data into her decision-making,
and so investment strategies requiring the calculation of
172. See Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 5556; see also Stoll, supra note
21, at 16768 (discussing the importance of index arbitrage in the 1980s).
173. See, e.g., Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 5455.
174. See, e.g., Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 5360; Bruno Biais &
Paul Woolley, High Frequency Trading § II.3 (Mar. 11, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript),
idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/conf/pwri/biais_pwri_0311.pdf (HFT
algorithms as mitigating traders cognition limits).
175. See Kirilenko & Lo, id. at 55.
176. See Stephanie Yang, The Epic Story of How a Genius Hedge Fund
Almost Caused a Global Financial Meltdown, BUS. INSIDER (July 10, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-fall-of-long-term-capital-management-
2014-7.
177. See Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 5859.
178. See Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Algorithms Take Control of Wall
Street, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.wired.com/2010/12
/ff_ai_flashtrading/ (describing areas where algorithmic trading excels over
human operators); see also Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 5355.
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matrices with hundreds of thousands of variables necessarily
require computer technology. Likewise, human traders find it
very difficult to monitor prices on more than a very small
number of financial markets simultaneously, so common
arbitrage strategies require computer assistance to implement.
In none of these basic types of algorithmic trading do we feel
that the use of algorithms or computers is intrinsically wrong
any more than we feel that flying goods from one market to
another does a moral wrong to those traders who continue to
move them by ship. Arbitrage is fundamentally a trading
activity, whereby parties profit by supplying a good to a market
where it is sold at a higher price than where it is originally
purchased.179 And while HFT grows out of these strategies, its
morally problematic aspects do not stem from the mere use of
computer technology, or even of the speed at which this
technology operates.
B. CO-LOCATION
Co-location is the first and most tangible manifestation of
HFT. It refers to the exchanges practice of renting space in the
facilities that house their computer servers to traders who
believe they can benefit from this proximity. 180 Co-location
facilitates the practice of latency arbitrage, trading between
markets based on pure speed. 181 To succeed at latency
arbitrage, a trader has to be first in line in the price-time order
queues used by the exchanges. It is a zero-sum game where the
order that is first in line with a bid or offer at an advantageous
price wins the competition.182
179. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY
5763 (2012) (Traders and Market Makers).
180. See Jerry Adler, Raging Bulls: How Wall Street Got Addicted to Light-
Speed Trading, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/2012/08/ff_wallstreet_trading/; Geoffrey Rogow,
Colocation: The Root of All High-Frequency Trading Evil?, WALL ST. J.: MKT.
BEAT BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat
/2012/09/20/collocation-the-root-of-all-high-frequency-trading-evil/; see also
Michael A. Goldstein, Pavitra Kumar & Frank C. Graves, Computerized and
High-Frequency Trading, 49 FIN. REV. 177, 188 (2014).
181. See David Gaffen, Measuring Arbitrage in Milliseconds, WALL. ST. J.:
MKT. BEAT BLOG (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2009/03/09/measuring-arbitrage-in-
milliseconds/.
182. See, e.g., id. (quoting a hedge fund technology officer stating that, with
HFT, [t]he fastest one wins).
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To illustrate the advantages afforded by co-location, a high
frequency trader located next to a server would have its orders
transmitted to the exchanges server nearly instantaneously,183
while an order transmitted by a trader through the fiber-optic
telecommunication networks from downtown Manhattan to the
NYSEs facilities in Mahwah, New Jersey would arrive in four
to seven milliseconds.184 Michael Lewiss Flash Boys tells the
story of the construction of a fiber optic line from Chicago to
Mahwah intended to shave three to four milliseconds off the
delivery time it would take for a message to be sent through a
telephone companys lines. 185 Each millisecond is worth an
estimated $100 million to a large brokerage firm,186 and the
firm constructing the line intended to profit by charging up to
200 firms an estimated $14 million each for a five-year lease to
use the new line.187
183. Round-trip transmission times for co-located computers are well
under a millisecond. See Co-location Services, EUREX EXCH.,
www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/technology/co-location-services/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2015). The Eurex Group states that co-location round-trip
transmission times are from 0.2-0.35 milliseconds. Id. Interestinglybecause
of what it implies about fairness and the perception of fairness among HFT
clients of the exchangesall messages from co-located computers within an
exchanges server facility travel the exact same length of fiber-optic cable to
reach the exchanges server; for computers on racks closer to the exchange
server, the cable is coiled up to equal the length of the most distant computers.
See David Schneider, The Microsecond Market, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 30,
2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/the-microsecond-market.
184. This 47 millisecond amount is determined by an experiment
performed by Flash Boys protagonist Brad Katsuyama. See LEWIS, supra note
1, at 6971. In order to test their execution program Thor, Katsuyama and
Ronan Ryan test when messages sent from their offices at One Liberty Plaza
in downtown Manhattan arrive at the various exchange servers in New
Jersey. Id. On the other hand, the fastest a message can travel from one
exchange server to another in their test is 465 microseconds, or 0.465
milliseconds. Id. at 71.
185. See id. at 6971. For additional information on the project in Flash
Boys, see Gregory Laughlin, Anthony Aguirre & Joseph Grundfest,
Information Transmission Between Financial Markets in Chicago and New
York 19 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 137, 2012).
Laughlin et al. determine that the Spread Networks fiber optic line detailed in
Flash Boys reduced the ChicagoNew Jersey latency to approximately 6.65
milliseconds. Id. at 2. In 2011 such times were reduced further to 4.25.2
milliseconds through the use of microwave communications networks. Id.
186. See Ciamac C. Moallemi & Mehmet Saglam, The Cost of Latency in
High-Frequency Trading 2 (Feb. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://moallemi.com/ciamac/papers/latency-2009.pdf.
187. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 15.
2016] HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 103
The major exchanges all rent space on their server racks to
outside parties. It is difficult to determine the exact amounts
charged for co-location, although industry observers believe
they have increased in recent years.188 Nevertheless, it does
appear to constitute a substantial portion of the yearly
revenues of the exchanges. 189 While such amounts may be
affordable to a HFT firm paying them, they would be
prohibitive for a retail investor,190 even if such individual had
the technical wherewithal to take advantage of a co-located
position. Though institutional investors could presumably
188. See SHORTER &MILLER, supra note 126, at 14 ([S]ecurities exchanges
began charging HFT firms substantially more for the right to be connected to
the exchanges data servers.); Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 183
(attributing the decline in profits among HFT firms in part to the costs of
rights and hardware for keeping computers close to the major exchanges).
189. For example, the most recent 10K available of Intercontinental
Exchange, Inc., the present operator of the NYSE as well as other securities,
futures, and options exchanges, reports that data services revenues (which
includes co-location fees) were $631 million in 2014, or 14.9% of total revenues
of $4.221 billion. See Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 2014 Annual Report (Form
10-K) 41 (Feb. 5, 2015), http://ir.theice.com/financial-reports/annual-
reports.aspx. This increased from 13.3% of revenues in 2013, 10.7% in 2012,
and 9.4% in 2011. Id. (Consolidated Statement of Income Data). Likewise,
the NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. reports that Access and Brokers Services
Revenues (which includes co-location fees) were $257 million out of $2.067
billion total revenues (less transaction-based expenses) in 2014, or 12.4%;
$255 million out of $1.895 billion in 2013, or 13%; and $257 million out of
$1.674 billion in 2012, or 15%. See NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., 2014 Annual
Report (Form 10-K) 3940 (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NDAQ/957273764x0xS1120193-15-
3/1120193/filing.pdf. While it is difficult to base conclusions on these amounts,
because specific co-location amounts are not broken out of their larger revenue
categories, co-location is believed to be a significant revenue stream for the
exchanges. See David Easley, Maureen OHara & Liyan Yang, Differential
Access to Price Information in Financial Markets 12 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1787029.
190. A 2009 article quotes an NYSE executive as stating that co-locating at
exchanges costs as much as $500,000 per month. Kristi Oloffson & Stephen
Gandel, High-Frequency Trading Grows, Shrouded in Secret, TIME (Aug. 5,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1914724,00.html.
Donald MacKenzie reports that he was told that a rack, a cabinet sized
space that can accommodate thirty or forty computers, costs between $1500
and $15,000 a month, whereas an entire cage . . . can easily cost more than
$1 million a year. Donald MacKenzie, Be Grateful for Drizzle, 36 LONDON
REV. BOOKS 27 (2014). And Ding et al. report that a co-located server using
only SIP data is approximately $7,000 per month, while one with a direct
data feed from the exchange costs three times as much. Shenwei Ding, John
Hanna & Terrence Hendershott, How Slow is the NBBO? A Comparison with
Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 315 n.3 (2014).
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afford them, they only make sense as part of a larger
investment in HFT, which involves considerable outlays for
technology and scarce personnel. 191 While each millisecond
saved in transmitting messages may be worth millions of
dollars per year per HFT firm, it effectively requires a multi-
million dollar investment in order to be able to capture these
gains.
Co-location has given rise to numerous criticisms and
complaints that it is unfair.192 It is easy to see the basis for this
complaint: if trading in computerized markets is essentially a
race to get to the exchange fastest, co-located traders are given
a head start that can never be caught up to. In this sense, co-
location goes directly against the (moral) intuition that at some
basic level, participants in the market should be on a level
playing field. 193 Here that field is uneven, where the vast
majority of participants have no chance of ever catching up.
The exchanges have a very basic response to such criticisms:
they do not discriminate among traders, and space in their
facilities is open to anyone willing to pay the specified cost.194
While such arguments are prima facie true, they neglect the
fact that only a very small subset of stakeholders has the
requisite ability to profit from co-location. Economically, co-
location is better seen as a sort of collusion on the part of the
exchanges with a small group of customers to profit at everyone
elses expense.195
There is also the question of the governments role in
allowing co-location. The SEC has permitted the practice,
reasoning that as long as anyone wishing to pay for it can have
191. See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 126, at 22 (while theoretically
open to all, co-location is only likely to make financial sense for organized,
institutional, strongly capitalized HFT firms).
192. See, e.g., SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 126, at 2223; Goldstein et
al., supra note 180, at 19495; Gomber et al., supra note 49, at 3435.
193. See infra Section III.D.
194. See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, CMEs Terry Duffy Talks Shop, CHI. TRIB.
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-cme-duffy-0908-biz-
20140905-story.html (We offer co-location to everybody . . . [and e]verybody
can have it at the same speed if they want it.); see also James J. Angel &
Douglas McCabe, Fairness in Financial Markets: The Case of High Frequency
Trading, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 585, 59091 (2013) (Does co-location give
traders an unfair head start? To certain extent, traders have always invested
heavily to get closer to the scene of trading.).
195. This is one of the central points of Arnuk and Saluzzis criticisms of
HFT. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 99101; see also infra notes
44142 and accompanying text.
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access, it is acceptable.196 Mary Jo White raised the issue of
fairness of co-location in her recent speech to market
participants, but from her comments it appears unlikely the
SEC would attempt to put the genie back in the bottle.197 And
while regulators may have been lax in allowing the exchanges
to rent space in their computer facilities, there are relatively
straightforward proposals to mitigate the problems that
result.198
C. FLASH ORDERS
Flash orders are another manifestation of HFT that have
received extensive attention in the media, Congress, and even
at the SEC.199 Investors in particular are upset that they allow
HFT firms a sneak peek at the market, in effect allowing
them to front-run their slower orders on their way to the
consolidated tape, now known as the SIP. 200 The SEC
196. See, e.g., Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Codify Prices
for Co-Location Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,861 (July 6, 2010) (The
Exchange has also represented that co-location services are generally
available to all qualified market participants who desire them.); Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Expanding Co-
location, 78 Fed. Reg. 69,907, 69,908 (Nov. 21, 2013) (As is the case with all
Exchange co-location arrangements . . . (ii) use of the co-location services
proposed herein would be completely voluntary and available to all Users on a
non-discriminatory basis . . . .).
197. See White, supra note 3 (The SEC should not roll back the technology
clock or prohibit algorithmic trading, but we are assessing the extent to which
specific elements of the computer-driven trading environment may be working
against investors rather than for them.).
198. E.g., id. Regarding these proposals, SEC Chair White said she has
instructed the staff to prepare recommendations for the Commission to
improve firms risk management of trading algorithms and to enhance
regulatory oversight over their use. Id.; see also ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note
131, at 22030 (offering proposals to improve the current state of the equity
markets); infra note 357 and accompanying text (discussing proposal to
institute batch auctions).
199. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, S.E.C. Starts Crackdown on Flash
Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at B1; Nina Mehta, Equities Industry
Clashes over Flash and Step-up Orders, TRADERS MAG., July 1, 2009. The U.S.
Senate held hearings on HFT issues including flash orders on Oct. 28, 2009.
Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-Frequency Trading, and Other Market
Structure Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009).
200. See, e.g., Alan Chan, Do High Frequency Traders Front-Run the
Market by Using Their Speed Advantage?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/04/03/do-high-frequency-traders-front-
run-the-market-by-using-their-speed-advantage/; see also ARNUK & SALUZZI,
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acknowledged this controversy with its 2009 Release 201
proposing the elimination of the exception to Regulation NMS
Rule 602 that permits flash orders, but no action has been
taken since.202
A flash order is an order that an exchange cannot
immediately fill which is then submitted to certain market
participants before it is transferred to the SIP pursuant to
NMS Rule 602.203 Rule 602(a)(1)(i)(A) provides an exception to
the general requirement that an exchange submit its best bids
and offers to the SIP in the case of bids and offers that are
executed immediately after communication or cancelled or
withdrawn if not executed immediately after
communication. 204 The precursor to Rule 602 was
implemented in 1978 205 when the markets operated almost
entirely without the use of computerized information
technology.206 This exception allowed an exchange to flash its
order to floor brokers to see if it could be filled before it was
sent to the consolidated tape.207 Both the party submitting the
order and the party filling it would benefit in the event the
supra note 131, at 84 (describing flash orders as allowing a sneak peek into
the market).
201. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation
NMS, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,632 (Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
Flash orders were originally allowed under SEC Release No. 34-54422. Order
Approving a Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,537
(Sept. 15, 2006).
202. This is probably because BATS, NASDAQ, and NASDAQ OMX BX
decided to discontinue offering flash orders as of September 1, 2009 as they
encountered controversy and the possibility of government regulation. See
Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74
Fed. Reg. at 48,635. Direct Edge offered them until February 2011. See Jacob
Bunge, Direct Edge to Stop Flashing Orders on Monday, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052748703409304576166930877474292. An estimated 3.1% of
total equity trading volume was executed by means of a flash order in July
2009. See Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation
NMS, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,635.
203. 17 C.F.R. § 242.602 (2015) (presenting requirements for
[d]issemination of quotations in NMS securities).
204. Id. § (a)(1)(i)(A).
205. For information on the precursor to the modern Rule 602, see
Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, 43 Fed. Reg. 4342 (Feb.
1, 1978) (formerly codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
206. See Fox et al., supra note 12, at 198.
207. See Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation
NMS, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,63436.
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order was filled, and the exchange benefitted by retaining the
transaction.208
In the modern computerized context, the same economic
principles can hold true, though the economics of flash orders
are greatly affected by the maker/taker payment system.209
When flash orders are used in the current environment, they
are flashed to HFT traders for 30 to 150 milliseconds before
they are sent on, if not filled, to the SIP.210 Parties submitting
an order can benefit by its immediate execution, often at a
better price than would otherwise be available, and responders
benefit by making a trade at a price they believe is
advantageous. 211 Furthermore, in a maker/taker system,
parties want their orders flashed to potential respondents, as
they will garner a rebate for posting a quote another party
hits.212 That said, flash orders may be used in ways widely
considered unfair. 213 A party that sees a flash order is in
essence given an early picture of what the NBBO for a stock is
likely to be, so they can then go into the market and trade on
the basis of that information ahead of the order being
incorporated into the NBBO disseminated by the SIP.214 This
sneak peek serves as grounds for the often heard complaint
that flash trading enables front-running. 215 While this is
208. See generally id. at 48,63738 (detailing the benefits of flash orders to
various market participants).
209. See Harris & Namvar, supra note 148, at 1113. Harris and Namvar
explain that flash orders are indirectly driven by the maker/taker payment
system. Id. This is because liquidity rebates allow Makers to quote better
prices at make-or-take exchanges than they would quote at transaction fee
exchanges, which forces transaction fee exchanges to route orders for the
benefit of customers, who then receive better prices without paying the access
fee. Id. at 12. Flash orders are an ad hoc solution to the pricing problems of
exchanges that charge transaction fees, because they allow them to sidestep
this pricing problem. Id.
210. Id. at 4. The longest allowable interval an exchange can flash an order
is 500 milliseconds, or half a second. See Keith Spence, Flash Trading, 29 B.U.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 98, 100 (2009).
211. See Harris & Namvar, supra note 148, at 56.
212. See id. at 3; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
213. See Harris & Namvar, supra note 148, at 9.
214. Elaine Wah & Michael P. Wellman, Latency Arbitrage, Market
Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model, 14 ASSN FOR
COMPUTING MACH. CONF. ON ELEC. COM. 855 (2013),
http://web.eecs.umich.edu/srg/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ec38-wah.pdf.
215. One of Lewiss central themes is that a great deal of HFT activity
amounts to electronic front-running. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 89127, 172;
accord Korsmo, supra note 12, at 558 (characterizing front-running by HFT as
parasitic order anticipation); Wah & Wellman, supra note 214. Because of
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(usually) not technically true, as HFT traders are not generally
the brokers for clients submitting the order, and so do not have
a duty to refrain against trading on this information, 216 it
otherwise amounts to the same thing.
Another aspect of the criticism over flash orders is the
more general charge that they are a factor in the creation of a
two-tiered system, where certain inside players have access to
fundamentally better information than everyone else.217 There
is much to this charge, and it illustrates the basic phenomena
of unfairness that many associate with HFT.218 In a two-
tiered system, certain players will be given informationin
case of flash orders, prior to its general release to the public
that everyone else lacks. Since information is the basis of all
investment, this timing advantage will allow for HFT to earn
riskless profits at the expense of the general investing public.219
time delays in messages travelling from exchanges to the SIP, and then to
other traders, HFT firms have the technical ability to use information gained
in one market to trade in other markets before non-HFT traders can; flash
orders are only one mechanism by which this can occur. See Wah & Wellman,
supra note 214. The question for investors, regulators, and legal scholars is
whether this is illegal. Insofar as most small HFT firms are not trading on
behalf of clients or customers, it would not be illegal, as they are not bound by
any restrictions that apply to broker-dealers. See, however, infra note 235 on
the question of HFT and insider trading. On the other hand, the proprietary
trading operations of the large banks would likely be in violation of these
obligations, particularly when they are trading ahead of customer trades in
their own dark pools.
216. See supra note 33 (discussing front-running and securities law). It is
important to note that a multi-district lawsuit against the exchanges alleging,
among other things, liability under Exchange Act Section 10(b) for enabling
electronic front-running by means of co-location and proprietary data feeds,
was rejected for failure to state a claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See In
re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., No. 14-MD-2589
(JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113323, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015).
Relying on Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), as well as other precedent, the court determined
that manipulative scheme claims pursuant to Section 10(b) must be primary,
not secondary, violations, and that merely providing services to HFT firms
that post quotes does not qualify as a manipulative act. See id. at *4247.
217. E.g., Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of
Regulation NMS, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,632, 48,636 (Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified
17 C.F.R pt. 242).
218. Id. at 48,63539.
219. While profits of HFT appear to have suffered significant decline in
recent years, in the heyday of HFT the most successful firms made consistent
and remarkably risk-free returns. Baron et al. analyze the profits made on E-
mini S&P 500 futures contracts from August 2010 to August 2012, finding
that HFT firms achieved abnormally high Sharpe ratios in their trading,
indicating unusually high risk-adjusted returns. See Matthew Baron,
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Flash orders may also have important second-order effects
on the exchanges and brokers posting orders there. At base, the
motivation for an exchange to issue flash orders may be to get
HFT firms to play in one exchanges sandbox over
anothers.220 Exchanges compete intensely for order flow, and
in a maker/taker system they provide a small rebate for orders
that are filled. In order to get HFT firms to post quotes in its
market or to fill orders there, an exchange may use flash orders
to entice such firms to be present in the first place.221 While
flash orders appear to have considerable benefits for both
suppliers and responders to quotes, they may also in some
circumstances work against the interests of quote suppliers.222
This would therefore be an instance of exchanges privileging
their best customers, the HFT firms, at the expense of their
less important ones. Finally, flash orders are part of a web of
forces perverting the relationship of brokers to their clients.223
In order to get customer orders, exchanges are willing to pay
brokers for their orders, which are then flashed to their best
Jonathan Brogaard & Andrei Kirilenko, Risk and Return in High Frequency
Trading 20 (May 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2433118 ([W]hile HFTs
bear some risk, their risk-adjusted returns are unusually high.). In addition
to the trading data, reports that firms such as Tradebot and Virtu Financial
suffered virtually no trading losses for years on end indicate that, at least for a
time, certain firms made riskless profits. See Gandel, supra note 8; Reuters,
High-speed Trader Virtu Financial Eyes $2.6 Billion Valuation in IPO,
FORTUNE (Apr. 6, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/04/06/virtu-financial-ipo/.
This has prompted some commentators to liken the returns in HFT to
economic rents. See Coffee, supra note 86 ([S]ome high frequency traders
have made enormous profits that resemble economic rents.); Wallace C.
Turbeville, Cracks in the Pipeline Part Two: High Frequency Trading, DEMOS
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/cracks-pipeline-part-two-
high-frequency-trading (These findings persuasively suggest that HFT does
not merely provide liquidity to the market, but rather extracts value well
beyond the value of liquidity provided.); Fox et al., supra note 12, at 24144
(explaining how slow market arbitrage by HFT adds a third party, the
liquidity supplier, whose only social purpose is to facilitate trades between
regular traders but who instead is the only gainer from the so-called arbitrage
activity, and that [t]he regular practice of HFT exploitation of dark pool
midpoint orders provides rents to HFTs).
220. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 84.
221. See id. at 75 (flash orders as a favor to HFT); see also Harris &
Namvar, supra note 148, at 56 (benefits of flash orders).
222. See Harris & Namvar, supra note 148, at 2 (although in most
instances Submitters would be expected to benefit through flash orders, they
do open themselves up to being front-run by Responders).
223. See, e.g., ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 5859.
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clients.224 The payment for order flow means that brokers may
not be acting strictly in the interests of their clients.225 Rather,
they are acting to some extent in their own interests by
allowing the decision of where to send a customer order to be
influenced by payment from an exchange.226 Insofar as they
constitute a reason that exchanges have for paying for order
flow, flash orders seem to be a corrupting influence on
brokers.227
D. DIRECT AND ENRICHED DATA FEEDS
Flash orders and the controversy surrounding them are
just one instance of how, in the process of solving existing
market problems, the exchanges create other ones in the form
of informational disparities. In some cases, the solutions are
enabled by a provision of Regulation NMS that existed before
the computerization of the markets, as in the case of the flash
order exception and the intermarket sweep order. 228 The
problem solved by direct data feeds on the other hand is a
very basic one created by the intersection of Regulation NMS
with the information technology infrastructure of the SIP: the
NBBO mandated by Regulation NMS will always be a few
milliseconds, or even microseconds, behind the true state of the
market as reflected in the prices at the various computer
servers that constitute the real national market system.229 As a
result, traders will want access to the prices at the same time
or even before they are sent to the SIP for inclusion in the
NBBO.230 Direct data feeds are the exchanges product that
224. See id. at 59 (linking flash orders to payment for order flow). On
payment for order flow in the HFT environment, see Scott Patterson, TD
Ameritrade Executive Says Orders Go to Venues that Pay Highest Fees, WALL
ST. J., June 17, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/td-ameritrade-executive-
says-orders-go-to-venues-that-pay-highest-fees-1403043559.
225. See Patterson, supra note 224.
226. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 5859.
227. Id.
228. For further discussion of ISOs, see infra Section II.F.
229. See Yoon, supra note 12, at 925 n.74 (stating that direct data feeds
will be five to ten milliseconds faster than the NBBO disseminated by the
SIP).
230. Id. at 925 (An arbitrage strategy involves identifying and capturing
the price discrepancies . . . .); see also Larry Tabb, Is the Increased Speed of
Direct Market Data Worth the Price?, WALL ST. & TECH. (Oct. 20, 2006),
http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/is-the-increased-speed-of-direct-market-
data-feeds-worth-the-price/d/d-id/1258127? (describing the costs and benefits
of investing in direct data feeds).
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meets this demand.231 Data is released directly to clients at
precisely the same time that it is sent to the SIP; given the
inherent delays in transmission and processing by the SIP, a
direct data feed is therefore a few milliseconds ahead of the
SIP. 232 Enriched data feeds, on the other hand, provide a
greater breadth of information than is sent to the SIP.233 As
with many of the techniques by which HFT operates, both
direct and enriched data feeds implicate very basic questions of
fairness in the electronic marketplace.234 Unlike many of the
other techniques, however, questions concerning the legality of
the transactions they enable have also been raised.235
231. See Yoon, supra note 12, at 925 n.74 ([T]raders can receive the
information in their individual data feeds provided by exchanges and ATSs
before the rest of the market.).
232. Id.; see also Ding et al., supra note 190, at 31821 (contrasting
differences in latency between the public (SIP NBBO) and proprietary
(synthetic NBBO) data).
233. See, e.g., Stop the Press  Exchanges See No Unfairness!, THEMIS
TRADING BLOG (Sept. 27, 2012), http://blog.themistrading.com/2012/09/stop-
the-press-exchanges-see-no-unfairness/ (We all know a few things about the
Stock Exchanges enriched data feeds. We all know they have more
information  like order IDs, cancel replace information, order identifiers and
modifiers, and of course hidden order information.); see also ARNUK &
SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 11117.
234. See, e.g., Stop the Press  Exchanges See No Unfairness!, supra note
233.
235. Regulators, legal academics, and plaintiffs have all raised the issue of
insider trading violations resulting from direct and enhanced data feeds from
the exchanges to their HFT clients. See, e.g., FY 2015 Budget Hearing: U.S.
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci. &
Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2014)
(statement of Eric Holder, Atty Gen. of the United States); Mercer E. Bullard,
HFT Isnt the ProblemInsider Trading Is, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101553082#; Coffee, supra note 86 ([I]f a dark pool
leaked information to a preferred, high frequency trader about the liquidity in
its pool, then an insider trading violation may have occurred. Material
information would have been passed by the dark pool to the high frequency
trader, arguably in return for high fees paid by the trader. That would satisfy
even a conservative definition of insider trading.); Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y.
State Atty Gen., Keynote Address at the New York Law School Symposium:
Insider Trading 2.0  A New Initiative to Crack Down on Predatory Practices
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/HFT_and_market_structure.pdf.
The plaintiff in City of Providence v. BATS Global Markets, Inc., 14-CV-2811
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2014) included insider trading violations in its complaint
at ¶¶ 12428, but the complaint was dismissed. In re Barclays Liquidity Cross
& High Frequency Trading Litig., No. 14-MD-2589 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 113323, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015) (dismissing consolidated
litigation including City of Providence).
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Direct data feeds involve the provision of price information
to traders for higher, premium fees than those paid to the
Consolidated Tape Association (or Consolidated Quote
Association) for the NBBO.236 Examples of direct data feeds
include NYSE Best Quote, NYSE Open Book, NYSE Amex Best
Quote, and NASDAQ ITCH.237 The SEC allows exchanges to
disseminate data to their trader clients simultaneously with
the provision of such data to the SIP,238 despite the fact that
this inevitably contributes to the problem of the staleness of
the NBBO.239 The SEC has determined that the simultaneous
release of market data to traders and the SIP is consistent with
the requirement of Rule 603(a) that information be released on
terms that are fair and reasonable and not unreasonably
discriminatory.240 While the SECs position is logical, it has
struggled with its implications in the HFT environment, where
any small difference in timing leads to an informational
advantage that cannot be overcome by slower traders. 241
Furthermore, at least one exchange, the NYSE, was found to be
violating the existing rule by sending data on its proprietary
data feeds ahead of its transmission to the SIP,242 and timing
disparities in the release of financial data were at the heart of
the unsuccessful lawsuits against the exchanges for HFT
practices.243
236. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 10102.
237. See id. at 10103; Easley et al., supra note 189, at 1 n.3.
238. See SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg.
3594, 3611 (Jan. 14, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 242).
239. Id. at 3608.
240. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a) (2015); see also Fox et al., supra note 12, at 271
(exploring an interpretation of Rule 603(a)(2) in which sending the data signal
simultaneously to HFT firms and the SIP is unreasonably discriminatory . . .
[since] it is predictable that some [end users] will consistently receive it faster
than others).
241. See SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. at
3611. Frank Pasquale draws attention to an analogous problem with the
release of material information by companies to the market. See Pasquale,
supra note 12, at 2106 n.114. While Regulation FD requires that companies
issuing material information release it at the same time to everyone, news-
release distributors sell direct access to such information to HFT firms, which
result in them receiving the information slightly before the rest of the
market. Id.
242. See N.Y. Stock Exch., LLC, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15023 (Sept. 14,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-67857.pdf; Jenny
Strasburg & Scott Patterson, NYSE Is Fined in Data Probe, WALL ST. J., Sept.
15, 2012, at A1.
243. Complaint at 78, Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 353
(S.D.N.Y 2015) (No. 14-CV-3745). Similar to the 2012 NYSE probe, see supra
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The proprietary, enriched data feeds offered by the
exchanges also offer a greater breadth of information than
those relying solely on the NBBO disseminated by the SIP can
obtain. Whereas the NBBO disseminated by the SIP offers only
the best bid and best offer, enriched data feeds will offer an
exchanges information on other customers orders, including
order cancellations, modifications, and executions.244 This even
includes information concerning order types that customers
believed were hidden from public view, so-called hidden order
types.245 A HFT firm making a substantial investment in the
required software can use an enriched data feed to discern the
direction of the market and then trade as quickly as possible on
that basis.246 Similar to flash orders, enriched data feeds allow
for what would be termed front-running if engaged in by a
broker-dealer.247 According to critics, enriched data feeds allow
high-frequency traders to effectively reverse engineer the
forces that led to a particular transaction (or the failure to
consummate a transaction), offering a valuable insight into the
markets direction.248 And insofar as the exchanges pay brokers
for their order flow to offer information concerning these orders
to HFT firms, the relation between a broker and its clients is
also compromised.
The questions of fairness raised by proprietary data feeds
are essentially similar to those raised by co-location and flash
orders: the exchanges offer one group of participants, who
possess the wherewithal and interest in profiting from data,
access to this data in return for high fees. What are the
expectations of market participants when they enter the stock
market? Is the creation of a two-tiered system, even when all
are, in principle, permitted to enter into the privileged cohort,
note 242, the plaintiff in Lanier alleged that data is provided by the defendant
exchanges ahead of its transmission to the SIP. See id. at 1314. The Lanier
complaint was dismissed on federal preemption grounds, as well as failure to
state a claim under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6). See Lanier, 105 F. Supp. 3d
353, 357.
244. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 11117.
245. Id. at 11315.
246. Id. at 112; see also id. 12122 (stating that some exchanges are even
disseminating machine-readable news).
247. For a recap of front-running and its implications, see supra note 215
and accompanying text.
248. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 102 (stating that
information in proprietary data feeds is valuable because it enables high
frequency traders to model the behavior of institutional and retail investor
orders to predict the short-term price movements of stocks).
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fair? Is it inevitable? Or should limitations be put upon the
information that exchanges are permitted to disseminate,
either for a fee or for free? Should the SEC reconsider its policy
that exchanges may disseminate their information to HFT
clients simultaneously with its transmission to the SIP and
instead focus on the time information is received by various
market players? And what about the effects enriched data feeds
may have on the relationship of brokers to their customers?
Direct and enriched data feeds give rise to many questions that
concern the fundamental fairness of the markets and the
creation of a two-tiered system.
E. SPOOFING, LAYERING, QUOTE STUFFING, ETC.: HFT AS
MARKETMANIPULATION
The next type of HFT activity involves the use of
information technology to engage in practices that are
essentially very high-speed versions of the pump-and-dump
schemes long known to regulators.249 These activities do not
rely on an intrinsic advantage in speed or data given to them
by a third party, such as the exchange; rather, they involve the
use of HFT technology to create certain conditions in the
market, often manipulating other algorithmic trading
programs, which the original HFT firms then takes advantage
of. It is as if HFT creates the weather in the financial
ecosystem and then profits from it.250
The most basic type of this activity involves creating
momentum through posting orders that are then cancelled
before they can be acted upon. Such strategies are often
referred to as momentum ignition strategies, as they involve
inducing other players in the market to act in a certain way,
driving the price of a security up or down.251 A simple example
of this might be if the NBBO for General Motors stock consists
of a bid at $15.10 and an offer at $15.14. Spoofing would
involve making an offer to buy (a bid) at $15.12, then executing
the opposite transaction, selling the security at this price, after
other players in the market have raised their bids in response
249. See Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 6668; Korsmo, supra note 12,
at 55157. For limitations on the ability of HFT to engage in pump-and-dump
strategies within the Eurobound futures market, see Irene Aldridge, Can
High-Frequency Traders Game Futures?, 7 J. TRADING 75 (2012).
250. See Korsmo, supra note 12, at 54849 (discussing momentum ignition
strategies).
251. See id. at 548.
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to the higher offer.252 Finally, the original offer to buy at $15.12
will be cancelled before other parties can act on it.253 In this
way prices in the market are manipulated higher or lower
without the manipulating party having to act on the quotes it
has placed on an exchange or other trading venue. The fact
that an estimated 95% of orders entered onto markets are
cancelled may illustrate how frequently this technique, along
with quote-stuffing, is used.254
Layering involves essentially the same technique but in a
series of successive steps. Here, a series of successively higher
(or lower) quotes are placed on one side of the market in order
to drive a price up or down; after the price has been
manipulated, a quote is then placed on the opposite side of the
market. 255 The purpose of this technique is to trick other
traders algorithms into detecting a pattern in the market, and
to then take advantage of their reaction. 256 For instance,
252. Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 6667; Goldstein et al., supra note
180, at 187. Section 747 (Antidisruptive Practices Authority) of the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, which added § 4c(a)(5) to the Commodities Exchange Act
(CEA), prohibits spoofing in the commodities markets. See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, § 747,
124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)); D. Denis
Aktas, Spoofing, 33 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 89, 9395 (2013). Both the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC have actively
prosecuted enforcement actions against traders alleged to be spoofing. See
Huw Jones & John McCrank, U.S. and U.K. Fine High-Speed Trader for
Manipulation, REUTERS (July 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2013/07/22/us-britain-fca-hft-idUSBRE96L0G620130722 (noting that a $6
million fine was levied by regulators against Panther Energy Trading LLC for
spoofing). The SEC has long prosecuted spoofing cases. See, e.g., Visionary
Trading, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71871, 2014 WL 1338258 (Apr. 4,
2014); Leonid Shpilsky, Exchange Act Release No. 17221, 2001 WL 1408740,
at *2 (Nov. 5, 2001). The first criminal conviction under CEA § 4c(a)(5)(C), of
Panther Energy Trading LLC principal Michael Coscia, occurred on Nov. 3,
2015 in United States v. Coscia, No. 14-CR-00551 (N.D. Ill. 2015). See Bradley
Hope, U.S. Wins Conviction in First Spoofing Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2015,
at C3.
253. See Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 6667.
254. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 32; Easley et al., supra note 165,
at 24 ([E]stimates by [the] TABB group put this [order cancellations] at
98%.). For discussion of the linked nature of submissions and cancellations,
see Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading, 16 J. FIN. MKTS.
646, 65864 (2013). For the contribution quote-stuffing may make to the
cancellation rate, see Jiading Gai, Chen Yao & Mao Yang, The Externalities of
High Frequency Trading 610 (Aug. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2066839.
255. See SHORTER &MILLER, supra note 126, at 23; Korsmo, supra note 12,
at 555.
256. See Korsmo, supra note 12, at 555.
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assume the price of a mid-cap stock with a low trading volume
has a best bid of $6.25 and a best offer of $6.75. Layering would
involve posting a bid of $6.28, then posting a bid of $6.30, and
then posting a bid of $6.32. After other parties then follow the
rising price, making bids at, say, $6.30, the original party will
sell the stock in the market at this higher price it itself has
induced. Finally, it will cancel its earlier bids that are still
open. Layering operates to trick other algorithmic traders into
acting on quotes that are never meant to be filled.257 The SEC
has prosecuted parties for layering activities; 258 they are
essentially the same as pump-and-dump schemes, although the
entire sequence of activity can occur in less than half a
second.259
Finally, quote stuffing involves using rapid-fire quotes to
overwhelm the capacity of exchange servers or other traders to
process them.260 As Charles Korsmo explains, this activity has
a two-fold purpose: since the trader making the burst of rapid
fire quotes can safely ignore them, while the algorithms of
other traders will not know to do this, the original trader
engaging in quote stuffing can slow his competitors down,
thereby gaining an advantage over them.261 Quote stuffing can
also be done to slow down the process of transmitting prices
from an exchange to the SIP, thereby creating arbitrage
opportunities between markets.262 Quote stuffing involves the
257. See, e.g., id. at 556 ([T]he Trillium case shows how more
sophisticated HFTs can potentially exploit other traders entirely through the
use of orders the HFTs never intend to execute.).
258. See Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 6667 (describing SEC actions
against Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services); see also Press Release,
Sec. & Exch. Commn, SEC Charges New York Based High Frequency Trading
Firm with Fraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices (Oct. 16, 2014)
(announcing that Athena Capital used its algorithm Gravy to manipulate
prices of stock during the final seconds of the trading day); Korsmo, supra note
12, at 555 n.155 (noting that Trillium Brokerage Services was subject to
FINRA sanctions for engaging in repeated instances of layering).
259. Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 67 (providing example of market
manipulation occurring within 839 milliseconds).
260. Korsmo, supra note 12, at 57576; see also Gai et al., supra note 254,
at 6 ([Q]uote stuffing . . . involves submitting a profuse number of orders to
the market to generate congestions on purpose.).
261. See Korsmo, supra note 12, at 575.
262. The rapid cancellation of quotes in quote stuffing delays the speed at
which trade information is reported, thus distorting the information sent to
other participants and creating arbitrage points for investors aware of the
delay. See Gai et al., supra note 254, at 2728.
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use of HFT technology to increase the opportunity for latency
arbitrage activities.
F. SPECIAL ORDER TYPES: HIDE NOT SLIDE, ISOS, AND
JUMPING THE QUEUE
The proliferation of special order types is a final set of
phenomena that tops off the complaints about market fairness
and HFT. 263 Given the market microstructure conditions
dictated by Regulation NMS, special order types are integral to
the suite of techniques HFT firms use to wring profits from the
equity markets.264 While these order types are ostensibly open
to all, they contain certain features that, in conjunction with
the high technical barriers to their use, give an unfair
advantage to HFT in the eyes of many observers. 265
Specifically, they allow their users to jump the queue in certain
situations that enable them to trade or collect a liquidity
provision rebate in a risk-free manner.266 While a number of
order types have come under fire as ethically questionable,267
and each exchange has its own variant, two of the most
263. For articles detailing the complaints concerning special order types,
see generally Herbert Lash, Complaints Rise over Complex U.S. Stock Orders,
REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-
exchanges-ordertypes-idUSBRE89I0YU20121019; Scott Patterson & Jenny
Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, a Way to Jump Ahead in Line, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100008723963904439892045775992436935616
70; Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Out of Order; New Ways to Buy and Sell Shares
on Exchanges Are Arriving Daily. Are Controls Needed on Choice, Complexity
and Competition?, TRADERS MAG., Jan. 2013, at 20. HFT practitioner-turned-
whistleblower Haim Bodek played a central role in publicizing the role special
order types play in HFT; his story is central to the narrative of Pattersons
Dark Pools. PATTERSON, supra note 11. On special order types generally, as
well as Bodeks contribution to this issue, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-
Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the Securities Market
Structure: One Whistleblowers Consequences for Securities Regulation, 2014
J.L. TECH. & POLY 145, 14754 (2014). Special order types have attracted the
attention of Congress as well as regulators. See Computerized Trading: What
Should the Rules of the Road Be?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins.
& Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
(2012); White, supra note 3.
264. See Dolgopolov, supra note 263, at 14851.
265. See, e.g., Haim Bodek, HFT Checkmate  The Alpha in Order Types,
TABB F. (Jan. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Bodek, HFT Checkmate],
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/hft-checkmate-the-alpha-in-an-order-type.
266. See Dolgopolov, supra note 263, at 157.
267. Bodek, HFT Checkmate, supra note 265.
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controversial are Hide Not Slide (or Hide and Light) orders
and Intermarket Sweep Orders.268
The Hide Not Slide order is designed to solve a problem
created by Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS. 269 Rule 610(d)
prohibits quotations that lock or cross the NBBO. Locking
occurs when a buy order (bid) is posted at the same price as an
order to sell (or offer) elsewhere in the national market system,
or an offer posted at the same price as a bid.270 Crossing occurs
when a bid is posted at a higher price than the best offer, or an
offer at a lower price than the best bid.271 The Hide Not Slide
order allows traders to sidestep the prohibition against locks
and crosses.272 In so doing, it also allows a trader to jump
ahead in the queue of orders, violating the principle of price-
time priority.273
When a broker posts a Hide Not Slide order, if it locks
another market, the exchange will slide the price down to the
next available price.274 For example, a $15.50 Hide Not Slide
bid that locks another market would be automatically changed
to $15.49, thereby avoiding a lock. Then, when the market
unlocks, the original bid $15.50 will be placed first in line. The
Hide Not Slide order accomplishes two things. First, it allows a
user to avoid sliding down to a lower bid (or higher offer) when
a bid or offer locks or crosses the market.275 Second, it allows
the user, when the market unlocks, to be at the top of the
queue.276
This queue-jumping feature is the key to the Hide Not
Slide order.277 The party successfully using a Hide Not Slide
268. See Sugato Chakravarty, Pankaj Jain, James Upson & Robert Wood,
Clean Sweep: Informed Trading Through Intramarket Sweep Orders, 47 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 415 (2012); Haim Bodek, Locked Markets,
Priority and Why HFTs Have an Advantage: Part 2: Hide & Light, TABB F.
(Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Bodek, Locked Markets],
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/locked-markets-priority-and-why-hfts-have-an-
advantage-part-2-hide-and-light (explaining Hide and Light).
269. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(d) (2015) (prohibiting [l]ocking or crossing
quotations).
270. See Schmerken, supra note 89, at 14.
271. Id.
272. Bodek, Locked Markets, supra note 268.
273. See id.
274. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, How Hide Not Slide Orders
Work, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, at A12.
275. Bodek, Locked Markets, supra note 268.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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order is now first in line, able to trade at the new best price in
the market, and to position itself advantageously to capture
any available liquidity rebates if the exchange uses a
maker/taker system. 278 This queue-jumping feature led to
significant controversy, but the exchanges could counter that
its use was in fact open to all.279 In addition to its unusual
characteristics, the manner in which the Hide Not Slide order
was introduced also led to criticism. Haim Bodek claims that
the documentation about these order types was insufficient,
and that the exchanges selectively disclosed their features to
their privileged HFT clients. 280 These allegations appear to
have been substantiated by the SEC in its recent
Administrative Order against EDGA Exchange, Inc. and EDGX
Exchange, Inc.281 Although the Respondents do not admit or
deny the SECs findings, they agreed to pay a $14 million fine
for, among other things, not accurately disclosing to all market
participants how the Hide Not Slide order type worked.282
Another key order for HFT activity is the Intermarket
Sweep Order or ISO.283 The ISO284 is specifically listed in
278. It is important to note that only the first party using a Hide Not Slide
order will jump the queueall others will be behind the slid regular orders.
This feature gives rise to particular suspicion that the Hide Not Slide order
was specifically formulated to benefit HFT traders, as it would only afford a
benefit to the one lucky firm that was first in line of all firms placing Hide Not
Slide orders. This suspicion appears to have been confirmed by the January
12, 2015 SEC Administrative Order against EDGA Exchange, Inc. and EDGX
Exchange, Inc., the successors to the Direct Edge exchange. See EDGA
Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74032, 2015 WL 137640, at *3 (Jan.
12, 2015); see also PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 339; OHara, supra note 148,
at 262.
279. See Patterson & Strasburg, supra note 263 (The exchanges position
is that these [advantages] are fully disclosed; they can be used by anyone with
the right hardware and technical savvy . . . .).
280. See Bodek, Locked Markets, supra note 268. But see MacKenzie, supra
note 6, at 44 (HFT interviewees denied that these order types were secret).
281. EDGA Exchange, Inc., 2015 WL 137640, at *11.
282. See Bradley Hope, BATS to Pay $14 Million to Settle Direct Edge
Order-Type Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/direct-edge-exchanges-to-pay-14-million-penalty-
over-order-type-descriptions-1421082603.
283. For the importance of ISOs to HFT, see MacKenzie, supra note 6, at
4245. For their appeal to traders, see Chakravarty et al., supra note 268, at
416 (The benefits of ISO usage include faster execution speed and the ability
to capture larger counterparty depth by concurrently submitting orders to
several markets . . . .). For the role of ISOs in the flash crash of May 6,
2010, see Madhavan, supra note 153, at 23 ([T]hese [ISO] orders may have
triggered the flash crash by aggressively taking bid-side liquidity.).
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Rule 611(b)(5) as an exception to Rule 610s prohibition on
trade-throughs.285 The stated purpose of this exception is to
facilitate the execution of block trades by broker-dealers on
behalf of institutional clients.286 An ISO allows for the purchase
or sale of stock at prices inferior to those listed in the NBBO in
order to access quotes deeper in the limit order book of an
exchange.287 For example, assume the NBBO for GM stock is
$18.00 best bid and $18.03 best offer. Exchange X has 3,000
shares of GM at the best offer price, and Trader B wants to
purchase 20,000 shares. Trader B can submit an ISO for 20,000
GM shares, purchasing the 3,000 at the NBBO price, and then
going deeper into the limit order book to purchase more shares
at inferior prices.288
The rationale for ISOs in the pre-electronic trading world
as facilitating block trades is easy to understand. Even though
an ISO may cause the client to pay a higher total price for a
block of shares than it would were those shares all available at
the NBBO, it may wish to acquire a greater amount of stock
than is immediately available at the NBBO.289 In this case, the
client likely fears the effect of a block trade on the price. In the
world of electronic trading, however, an ISO offers a number of
other potential advantages. First, in a market where speed is
284. 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(30) (2015) (defining [i]ntermarket sweep
order).
285. Id. § 242.611(b)(5).
286. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,536 (June 29, 2005) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (This exception particularly will facilitate the immediate
execution of block orders by dealers on behalf of their institutional clients.);
see also Chakravarty et al., supra note 268, at 41719 (discussing The ISO
Mechanism); Stavros Gadinis, Market Structure for Institutional Investors:
Comparing the U.S. and the E.U. Regimes, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 311, 35051
(2008).
287. See Gadinis, supra note 286, at 350.
288. See Fred and Ethel Called and Wanted to Know About Intermarket
Sweep Orders (ISOs), THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Dec. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Fred
and Ethel], http://blog.themistrading.com/fred-and-ethel-called-and-wanted-to-
know-about-intermarket-sweep-orders-isos/. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(c) specifies
that [t]he trading center, broker, or dealer responsible for the routing of an
intermarket sweep order shall take reasonable steps to establish that such
order meets the requirements set forth in § 242.600(b)(30). Simultaneously
with an ISO, § 242.600(b)(30) requires traders using an ISO to purchase the
full displayed size of shares on other markets that constitute protected offers
or bids, as applicable, at prices superior to the limit price of the ISO. 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.600(b)(30).
289. Gadinis, supra note 286, at 35051 (Despite these costly features,
ISOs offer the most straightforward method of executing large trades in the
National Market System.).
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paramount, it may allow traders to trade at better prices than
those on the SIP, when the SIP is stale.290 Second, exchanges
offer variants on the ISO such as the Post Only ISO that will
only be used in situations where the trader is attempting to
capture a rebate in a maker-taker pricing market.291 Third,
some ISO order types allow users to jump the queue just as
Hide Not Slide orders do.292 In short, ISOs can be valuable in a
variety of circumstances, and they are a key order type for HFT
firms.
III. AN ETHICS OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING
The techniques used by high frequency traders outlined
above generated intense controversy upon the publication of
Michael Lewiss Flash Boys. 293 While the controversy was
encapsulated in the perhaps overstated claim that the markets
were rigged, a close look at some of the objectionable
techniques of HFT supports the notion that some HFT
practices are indeed unfair.294 The purpose of Part III is to
290. See Chakravarty et al., supra note 268, at 416 (The benefits of ISO
usage include faster execution speed.).
291. See Fred and Ethel, supra note 288.
292. See id.
293. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 2.
294. The academic literature to date presents some discussion of why HFT
is often perceived as unfair. See, e.g., Angel & McCabe, supra note 194, at
58691 (describing various techniques used by HFTs); Dolgopolov, supra note
263, at 14950 (citing selective disclosure of special order types as especially
unfair); Goldstein et al., supra note 180, at 19495 (The fairness of very high-
speed trading); Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 60, 6768 (advantages
conferred by technological expertise as giving rise to fairness concerns);
Korsmo, supra note 12, at 528 (characterizing the speed and technological
sophistication of HFT firms as generating an appearance of unfairness);
OHara, supra note 148, at 269 ([T]he greater complexity, lower transparency,
and higher uncertainty of high frequency markets all contribute to a sense
that markets can be more fair for some than for others.); McGowan, supra
note 12, ¶ 45 (discussing how costs to retail traders in maker-taker payment
system prompt fairness concerns); Gomber et al., supra note 49, at 3436
(explaining fairness concerns as driven by the speed advantages derived from
co-location); MacKenzie, supra note 6, at 56 (attributing the hostility
surrounding HFT to its hidden nature). The SEC also questions the fairness of
investments in IT and human resources that effectively result in a two-tiered
marketplace. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3605 (Jan. 14, 2010) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 242) ([I]s it unfair for market participants to obtain a competitive
advantage by investing in technology and human resources that enable them
to trade more effectively and profitably than others?); cf. Charles Jones, What
Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading? 42 (Colum. Bus. Sch., Research
Paper No. 13-11, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236201 ([M]any of the
122 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
explain why many in the investing public reacted as they did
upon learning about HFT. In other words, Part III offers a
theoretical grounding to support the claim that some of HFTs
techniques are unfair.
It is important at the outset to acknowledge that HFT is
simultaneously part of the transformation of the equity
markets that has greatly reduced transaction costs for many
investors, and so has brought great benefits.295 Many defenders
of HFT repeatedly point this out, and a number of academic
studies document market benefits attributable, at least in part,
to HFT. 296 However, a general rebuttal to the unfairness
argument that HFT has lowered costs for many market
participants, even if true, misses the point. HFT may be part of
a transformation of the markets benefitting the average
investor at the same time that some of its more aggressive
techniques commit objectionable wrongs.297 We may be forced
to pick our poison, to paraphrase Professor Pirrong,298 but is
it wrong to hope for no poison at all? It is important to explain
the legitimate bases for complaints and to see how HFT
implicates a number of issues of wider concern to the financial
system.
In order to evaluate the moral status of the various HFT
strategies, a framework for normative analysis is required. The
framework must be detailed enough to apply in a
determinative fashion to financial markets activity, at the
same time that it should connect to at least one of the major
ethical schools that inform economic and public policy
discussions. In fact, relatively little has been written on
specifically ethical issues in finance.299 This is likely because
issues associated with HFT are the same issues that arise in more manual
markets.). In addition to the academic literature, the narratives of Michel
Lewis and Scott Patterson are largely driven by fairness concerns. LEWIS,
supra note 1; PATTERSON, supra note 11.
295. Jones, supra note 294, at 51 (Based on the vast majority of the
empirical work to date, HFT and automated, competing trading venues have
substantially improved market liquidity and reduced trading costs for all
investors.).
296. See id.; see also infra Section III.A.
297. See, e.g., Korsmo, supra note 12, at 52829, 57780 (suggesting that
the technological advantages of HFT can inadvertentlyor even
deliberatelycause extreme volatility events such as the Flash Crash).
298. See Pirrong, Pick Your Poison, supra note 70, at 14.
299. See John R. Boatright, Ethics in Finance, in FINANCE ETHICS 3, 3
(John R. Boatright ed., 2010) ([T]he academic study of finance ethics has
received surprisingly little attention from scholars in either finance or
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implicit in financial markets discussion, and economics more
generally, is a relatively well-defined ethical position. This is of
course utilitarianism. 300 While economics is not necessarily
business ethics.). Within FINANCE ETHICS, the most relevant to this
discussion of HFT are Robert W. Kolb, Ethical Implications of Finance, in
FINANCE ETHICS, supra, at 23; John Dobson, Behavioral Assumptions of
Finance, in FINANCE ETHICS, supra, at 45; and Eugene Heath, Fairness in
Financial Markets, in FINANCE ETHICS, supra, at 163. In the wider business
ethics literature, see also JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS IN FINANCE (3d ed.
2014); BOUDEWIJN DE BRUIN, ETHICS AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2015); Angel & McCabe, supra note 194, at 585; John Dobson & Ken Reiner,
The Rationality of Honesty in Debt Markets, 22 MANAGERIAL FIN. 20, 3132
(1996) (characterizing honest borrowers as necessary for the function of debt
market equilibrium); James O. Horrigan, The Ethics of the New Finance, 6 J.
BUS. ETHICS 97 (1987) (presenting normative ideas implicit in the New
Finance); Timothy C. Johnson, Reciprocity as a Foundation of Financial
Economics, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 43, 43 (2014) (arguing for reciprocity as a
fundamental principle of contemporary finance); Hersh Shefrin & Meir
Statman, Ethics, Fairness and Efficiency in Financial Markets, 49 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 21, 2122 (1993); Meir Statman, Regulating Financial Markets:
Protecting Us from Ourselves and Others, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 22, 2224
(2009). For articles exploring the links between ethics, trust, and finance in
the legal literature, see Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There
a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L.
191 (2013); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737
39 (2001) (arguing for the important role of trust as an internal constraint in
the corporation); Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors Trust in the
Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 439 (2002) (examining the relationship
between investors trust and government regulation of the markets); Peter H.
Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1159
(2003); Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a
View from a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 735
(2010); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 53537 (2006); Susanna Kim Ripken, The
Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 20304
(2006); Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407,
408 (2002) (investor trust as a foundation of the securities markets); John H.
Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring
Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1016
(2001). For critical appraisals of the role of ethical concepts in explaining
financial phenomena, see Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 113 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV.
553 (2001).
300. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawlss
Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 246 (1979) (The implicit ethical basis of
economic policy judgment is some version of utilitarianism.). For a
philosophical examination of the relationship between economics,
utilitarianism, and policy science, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling
Block: Freedom, Rationality, and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
263 (2002).
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utilitarian, as Judge Posner points out,301 it is conventionally
so.
Economics bears the stamp of utilitarianism because its
prescriptive counsels center around choosing the path of action
that results in the greatest amount of social welfare.302 Social
welfare is usually defined as the state of affairs resulting in the
greatest amount of utility for a given population.303 In order to
make this concept more susceptible to measurement, subjective
and amorphous elements such as fairness, justice, and morality
are commonly excluded from its definition.304 The concept of
social welfare is implicitly utilitarian because it defines the
good as the maximization of a possible amount of utility.305
Such a definition hearkens back to John Stuart Mills Greatest
Happiness Principle, in which actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and
the privation of pleasure.306 Social welfare therefore bridges
the divide between ethical inquiry and the discipline and
techniques of modern economics, and in so doing, illuminates
the roots of economics in utilitarianism.307
Despite its appeal, and the natural affinity of
utilitarianism and economics, utilitarianism faces a number of
powerful objections at the theoretical level, as well as obstacles
to its application in practice. Two are particularly relevant to
the discussion of HFT. The first is the problem of determining
the appropriate frame of reference for the distribution of costs
301. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
302. Schroeder, supra note 300, at 351 (In conventional economic analysis,
normative analysis is no different from prescriptive analysis, since the goal of
the legal system is to maximize social welfare . . . .) (quoting Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 147475 (1998)).
303. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
597 (2004).
304. See id. at 66465 (presenting the concept of social welfare as a narrow
aggregate of utilities, excluding fairness and distributional concerns).
305. See Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 464
(1979) ([W]elfarism . . . [as] the principle that the goodness of a state of
affairs depends ultimately on the set of individual utilities in that state, and
more demandinglycan be seen as an increasing function of that set.).
306. JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUARTMILL 203, 210 (John M. Robson ed., 1969) (1861).
307. See SHAVELL, supra note 303, at 60812 (discussing Welfare
Economics and Notions of Morality).
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and benefits: a straightforward utilitarianism only compares
the sum total of pleasures and pains in various possible states
of the world, neglecting their distribution through the
population in general. 308 A world where one individual
experienced intense pleasure and a complete absence of pain
while four others lived miserably could be deemed superior to
one in which five individuals lived very moderate but relatively
equal lives. A straightforward utilitarianism therefore
countenances the sacrifice of certain individuals, or their
interests, for the greater good.309 The discussion of HFT faces
an analogous framing problem: do the general market benefits
it may bring compensate for, or even cancel out, the wrongs it
commits against specific investors, or classes of investors, in
specific instances? What is the appropriate frame of reference
for evaluating costs and benefits? Is it the equity trading
market as a whole? Doesnt this imply that the interests of
some investors, or classes of investors, may be sacrificed for the
greater good, in the form of the efficiency of the larger trading
system? While we do not want to ignore the benefits of the
current market system, it seems obtuse to deny that sometimes
HFT operates in a manner that is unfair.310
Second, the attempt to put utilitarianism into practice in
many contemporary settings is hampered by the complexity of
causal relationships among components of a given social,
technological, or ecological system, and the concomitant
difficulty of measuring inputs and outputs in such a system.311
For example, in the field of finance, standard economic policy
prescriptions are subject to debate because of the inherent
complexity of the system and the difficulty of assessing
whether a given policy in fact results in an increase in social
308. See Samuel Scheffler, Introduction, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 1, 23 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988) (pointing out the objection that
[p]rovided net aggregate satisfaction is maximized . . . utilitarianism is
indifferent as to how satisfactions and dissatisfactions are distributed); John
Rawls, Classical Utilitarianism, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS
supra, at 14, 17 (Thus there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of
some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others . . . .).
309. See Scheffler, supra note 308.
310. E.g., RISHI NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX 283 (2d ed. 2013) (In
sum, its hard to see any merit in the idea that HFT is unfair or creates a two-
tiered marketplace.).
311. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit Analysis
in Financial Regulators, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351 (2013) (emphasizing the
difficulty of making predictions about the financial system, which is itself
constructed by regulation and subject to unpredictable second-order effects).
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welfare.312 While it is only a part of the much larger financial
system, these same problems affect the attempt to offer policy
prescriptions concerning HFT. We know that a large amount of
equity trading occurs in the dark marketsthough exactly
how much we dont knowwhile at the same time the system
of trading venues, market participants, regulators, and
regulation is sufficiently complex that definitive statements
about the operation of cause and effect in this system are often
impossible.
Because the current equity trading markets present
considerable obstacles to the successful implementation of the
standard economic framework taken from utilitarianism, Part
III presents an alternative ethical framework for financial
markets activity. While economic costs and benefits are taken
into account in this framework,313 at its base is the principle of
reciprocity, which reflects a fundamentally deontological
ethical stance. Upon this foundation we can construct the
additional principles of freedom from misrepresentation, a level
playing field, and institutional integrity. While the exact extent
of these principles is subject to disagreement, it is likely that
312. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:
Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2015) ([C]ase studies
show that quantified . . . [cost-benefit analysis] amounts to no more than
guesstimation, entailing: (a) causal inferences that are unreliable under
standard regulatory conditions; (b) the use of problematic data; and/or (c) the
same kinds of contestable, assumption-sensitive macroeconomic or political
modeling used to make monetary policy.); see also Gordon, supra note 311, at
S351 (Instead of weighing costs and benefits, financial regulation necessarily
is based on a series of trade-offs of normatively derived values, which may
entail principles of pragmatic design.). But see Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 198384 (2013) (proposing a framework for cost-benefit
analysis of regulations); Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for
Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (2013) (offering
suggestions for how regulatory benefits can be quantified); Cass R. Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Knowledge Problem (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for
Bus. & Govt, Harv. Kennedy Sch., Harv. U., Working Paper No. RPP-2015-03,
2014) (presenting a solution-based defense of cost-benefit analysis despite the
knowledge problem),
http://papers.ssrn.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508965.
313. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 299, at 2629 (providing a framework for
finance ethics that includes the utilitarian concept of welfare as well as duties,
rights, and fairness); Shefrin & Statman, supra note 299, at 23 (Policymakers
operate as if they have utility functions that depend on both efficiency and
fairness.). This approach implicates the well known equity/efficiency trade-
off. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
(1975).
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their very real, yet imperfect, instantiation in economic life
allows for the flourishing of our financial markets.314 These
principles also allow us to understand why critics claim that
HFT is not fair and in what sense they are correct. First,
however, it is important to survey the finance literature
exploring the costs and benefits of HFT.
A. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HFT
In response to the rapid development of HFT over the
course of the past decade, numerous academic studies have
attempted to quantify the benefits and costs of HFT. The
effects of HFT on price discovery, liquidity, spreads, and stock
market volatility are the subjects of detailed studies, as well as
HFTs potential role in creating a socially wasteful arms race
among traders and heightening systemic risk in the financial
system. Benefits commonly discussed relate to the role HFT
plays in advancing price discovery and the provision of
liquidity; alternatively, costs relate to liquidity, technological
arms races, adverse selection, and contribution to systemic
risk.
Contribution to the process of price discovery is frequently
claimed to be a benefit of HFT. In High Frequency Trading and
Price Discovery, Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott,
and Ryan Riordan examine transaction level data from 2008 to
2009 for 120 randomly selected NASDAQ and NYSE stocks,
dividing them into large, medium, and small cap categories.315
Dividing traders into HFT and non-HFT categories, the
authors find that HFT contributes to price discovery through
selling in the direction of permanent price changes and away
from transitory pricing errors.316 Overall, HFT traders benefit
314. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting: Comparing
Benefits, Cost and Risk (B.U. Sch. L., Working Paper No. 99-12, 1999),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=214588 ([A] stable
financial system requires the support of fiduciary law principles, judicial
enforcement, and monitoring by independent regulatory agencies.); see also
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425,
425 (1993) (citing trust in the corporate fiduciarys fairness as a precondition
of the corporate enterprise); Stout, supra note 299, at 408 (Investor trust
provides the foundation on which the American securities market has been
built.). See also infra note 456 and accompanying text.
315. Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High
Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUDIES 2267, 2271
(2014) [hereinafter Brogaard et al., Price Discovery].
316. Id. at 2280; see also Jonathan Brogaard, Al Carrion, Thibaut, Ryan
Riordan, Andriy Shkilo & Konstantin Sokolov, High Frequency Trading and
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from price discovery,317 but the information HFT uses is limited
to a three to four second span. 318 Consequently, [i]f this
information would become public without HFTs, then the
potential welfare gains may be small or negative if HFTs
impose significant adverse selection on longer-term
investors. 319 Similarly, in a study of the foreign exchange
markets between 2003 and 2007, Alain Chaboud, Benjamin
Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson, and Clara Vega find that
algorithmic trading improves price efficiency. 320 They also
determine that algorithmic trading increases the efficiency of
prices through liquidity provision, not from reaction to posted
quotes.321
Perhaps even more importantly, HFT is said to benefit
measures of marketplace liquidity. Terrence Hendershott,
Charles Jones, and Albert Menkveld study a group of 943
stocks from February 2001 through December 2005 in Does
Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity? 322 The NYSE
introduced its Autoquote system over the course of January
29, 2003 to May 27, 2003. 323 This provides an important
opportunity to test the effects of algorithmic trading on the
market because Autoquote enabled algorithmic traders to place
quotes on a market that previously operated manually.324 The
authors use the rate of electronic message traffic as a proxy for
Extreme Price Movements (Mar. 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2531122.
317. See Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, Algorithmic Trading and
Information 4 (June 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hender/atinformation.pdf (AT [(algorithmic
trading)] contribute[s] more to the efficient price by having more efficient
quotes and AT demanding liquidity so as to move the prices towards the
efficient price.). For a theoretical model with this same implication, see Bruno
Biais, Thierry Foucault & Sophie Moinas, Equilibrium High Frequency
Trading 27 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1834344 (HFT orders impound information into
prices faster.).
318. Brogaard et al., Price Discovery, supra note 315, at 2302.
319. Id.
320. Alain P. Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara
Vega, Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange
Market, 69 J. FIN. 2045, 2045 (2014).
321. Id. at 2048.
322. Terrence Hendershott, Charles M. Jones & Albert Menkveld, Does
Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J. FIN. 1, 6 (2011).
323. Id. at 14.
324. See id. at 13 (describing the purpose of Autoquote).
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the amount of AT [algorithmic trading]325 and the reduction in
effective spreads as a liquidity measure.326 They conclude that
AT does in fact improve liquidity for large-cap stocks. 327
Likewise, Hasbrouck and Saar look at NASDAQ data for two
groups of stocks from October 2007 and June 2008.328 Focusing
on strategic runs of messages ranging from three to more
than ten, they find that higher low-latency activity implies
lower posted and effective spreads, greater depth, and lower
short-term volatility.329 Interestingly, they find that the effect
of HFT activity on measures of market quality increased in the
June 2008 sample, which was a time of heightened market
stress caused by the first tremors of the financial crisis of
2008.330 They suggest that [i]t is reasonable to assume that
higher volatility creates more profit opportunities for high-
frequency traders.331
Despite these papers detailing certain benefits, some
financial economists present results that appear to support the
popular criticisms of HFT regarding liquidity voiced by Sal
Arnuk and Joseph Saluzzi, 332 Michael Lewis, 333 and Scott
Patterson.334 Andrei Kirilenko and Andrew Lo note that [i]n
contrast to a number of public claims, high-frequency traders
do not as a rule engage in the provision of liquidity like
traditional market makers. In fact, those that do not provide
liquidity are the most profitable and their profits increase with
the degree of aggressive, liquidity-taking activity.335
More specifically, economist Vincent van Kervel examines
trading data for a group of ten randomly selected FTSE 100
325. Id. at 6.
326. Id. at 710.
327. Id. at 3; cf. Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High
Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design
Response 37 (June 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/eric.budish/research/HFT-
FrequentBatchAuctions.pdf (arguing that while liquidity has improved in
recent years, it is probably from the increased role of informational technology
as there is little support for the proposition that the speed race per se has
improved liquidity).
328. Hasbrouck & Saar, supra note 254, at 648.
329. Id. at 667.
330. Id. at 670.
331. Id. at 673.
332. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 2728.
333. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 10709.
334. PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 253.
335. Kirilenko & Lo, supra note 125, at 60.
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stocks trading on the London Stock Exchange as well as the
Chi-X, BATS, Turquoise, and NASDAQ OMX Europe venues.336
He finds that a trade on one venue results in substantial
cancellations of limit orders on the other venues: within 100
milliseconds after a trade on some venues, 3985% of the order
size is cancelled on competing venues. After one second this
number increases to 98125%, which shows that the impact of
a trade on liquidity is in fact twice the trade size. 337 He
therefore concludes that the interrelation of liquidity across
trading venues causes substantial overestimation of liquidity
aggregated over these trading venues.338
Jiading Gai, Chen Yao, and Mao Ye look at the very fastest
trading environments, where orders occur at microsecond (and
even nanosecond) 339 speeds. 340 They contrast the HFT
environment, where time is infinitely divisible but prices are
constrained by a minimum $0.01 tick size, with the ideal world
of Walrasian economics where price is infinitely divisible but
time is not.341 In the HFT world, then, the competition for
speed is a consequence of a failed price competition, and an
increase in speed does not change the cost of liquidity
although it does decide who supplies this liquidity.342 Looking
at a variety of datasets including NASDAQ TotalView ITCH,
the authors conclude that in the nanosecond environment,
[o]ur empirical results suggest that the impact of speed on
liquidity is insignificant.343
Two recent papers in the legal literature also cast doubt
upon the alleged benefits of HFT on share prices. In The New
Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense,344 Merritt Fox, Lawrence
Glosten, and Gabriel Rauterberg argue that electronic front
running harms informed traders345 and so [t]he elimination of
electronic front running would make it more profitable for
336. Vincent van Kervel, Liquidity: What You See Is What You Get? 3, 18
19 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin
/home/Department_of_Finance__VG5_/LQ5/VanKervel.pdf.
337. Id. at 29.
338. Id. at 2.
339. A microsecond is one millionth of a second, and a nanosecond one
billionth. A nanosecond is to one second as one second is to 31.71 years.
340. Gai et al., supra note 254, at 2.
341. Id. at 4.
342. See id. at 16.
343. Id. at 25.
344. Fox et al., supra note 12.
345. Id. at 23032.
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these traders to engage in their activity . . . . As a result, prices
will be more accurate.346 This would benefit the economy at
large by improving the allocative efficiency of the capital
markets and the signals given to management, boards, and
investors. 347 Likewise, in How Algorithmic Trading
Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, Yesha Yadav
focuses on harm to the accuracy of prices and the consequences
for the financial regulatory system at large, which has relied in
recent decades on the assumption that stock market prices
accurately reflect the available information concerning
securities.348 While these papers do not present econometric
analyses of HFT data, they do present theoretical arguments
that call into question the belief that the effects of HFT on
prices will be on net socially beneficial.
The idea that HFT may be at base a socially wasteful arms
race is behind one of the most celebrated recent papers on HFT,
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch
Auctions as a Market Design Response.349 Eric Budish, Peter
Cramton, and John Shim look at market data from the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange and the NYSE relating to two related
securities, the SPDR S&P 500 exchange-traded fund (SPY) and
the S&P 500 E-mini futures contract (ES), from the period
20052011.350 They find that while the prices of the SPY and
the ES are almost perfectly correlated in normal human time,
at the millisecond level at which HFT occurs the correlation
breaks down completely.351 This breakdown allows for the HFT
practice of sniping, picking off stale quotes as an arbitrage
activity. 352 Most importantly, while the time horizon over
which the arbitrage opportunities exist shrinks drastically over
the period studied, the value of the arbitrage does not. 353
Similar to Gai, Yao, and Ye, Budish, Cramton, and Shim
believe that the current market design forces traders into a
socially wasteful arms race to avoid being picked off.354 HFT
firms face a prisoners dilemma: they would all be better off not
346. Id. at 234.
347. Id.
348. Yadav, supra note 12, at 160708.
349. Budish et al., supra note 327.
350. Id. at 2.
351. Id. at 23, 12 (Figure 1.1, ES and SPY Time Series at Human-Scale
and High-Frequency Time Horizons).
352. Id. at 5.
353. Id. at 2.
354. Id. at 1.
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engaging in such a competition, but avoiding it individually
would doom a firm to failure.355 Budish and others, are careful
to point out that their model does not imply that on net HFT
has been negative for liquidity or social welfare, but simply
that sniping is negative for liquidity and that the speed race is
socially wasteful.356 Their paper proposes the introduction of
batch auctions every 100 milliseconds as a mechanism that
could undercut the arms race and force traders to compete on
price, not speed.357
While the costs of HFT arms races are borne directly by
the competitors in the tournament for speed, HFT imposes
substantial adverse selection costs on all those who choose not
to enter this competition.358 These slower traders are typically
institutional investors and their brokers.359 They may attempt
to avoid the worst of the costs by using smart order routers to
send large orders, or by trading in dark pools, but they pay
higher costs because they cannot compete in the race for speed.
A variety of economists have explored adverse selection costs in
the HFT context,360 though coming to a reliable estimate of the
total amount would seem to be impossible.
Finally, HFT may contribute to systemic risk in the
financial system, although its exact role as a cause is far from
clear. It appears to have been a contributing factor in the
Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, though not a fundamental
cause.361 HFT is also suspected of contributing to the numerous
355. Id. at 35.
356. Id. at 37.
357. Id. at 3942.
358. See Brogaard et al., Price Discovery, supra note 315, at 2268; see also
Budish et al., supra note 327, at 35.
359. See Fox et al., supra note 12, at 231.
360. See, e.g., Brogaard et al., Price Discovery, supra note 315, at 2268 (We
show that HFTs impose adverse selection costs on other investors.); Easley et
al., supra note 189, 1314 (including an adverse selection effect in their
model which ultimately makes the market less liquid); Lin Tong, A Blessing or
a Curse? The Impact of High Frequency Trading on Institutional Investors 31
(Oct. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330053 (I find strong evidence that an increase in
HFT is associated with an increase in the trading costs of institutional
investors.).
361. Kirilenko et al., supra note 153, at 2; see also Kirilenko & Lo, supra
note 125, at 6263. For a far more skeptical reading, see Nanex, Reexamining
HFTs Role in the Flash Crash, NANEX RES. (June 12, 2014),
www.nanex.net/aqck2/4650.html.
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mini flash crashes that have occurred.362 HFT can contribute
to systematic risk by speeding up the response to financial
information and removing the ability of humans to sense risk
in the trading environment, in effect putting trading systems
on an extremely fast autopilot.
In the final analysis, it is hard to know whether HFT
provides a net benefit to the financial markets because of the
complexity of the trading environment and the incredible
difficulty of accurately estimating costs and benefits. 363 It
seems safe to conclude that HFT is part of the revolution that
greatly lowered transaction costs for investors, although
decimalization and the general application of information
technology to the financial markets would also appear to
account for much of the benefit. On the other hand, it seems
clear that HFT imposes significant adverse selection costs on
slower traders, and the liquidity benefits it provides are subject
to important caveats. Moreover, its benefits to the price
discovery process may be questionable if it only imparts
information to the markets a few seconds sooner than it would
otherwise arise. 364 It appears impossible in practice, if not
theory, to answer the question Is HFT good or bad? using a
conventional economic analysis that relies on enumeration of
costs and benefits.
362. See Bowley, supra note 157; Neil Johnson, Zhao Guannan, Eric
Hunsader, Jing Meng, Amith Ravinder, Spencer Carran & Brian Tivnan,
Financial Black Swans Driven by Ultrafast Machine Ecology 1 (Feb. 7, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.1448.
363. Craig Pirrongs conclusion on the relation of informed to uniformed
traders captures this point:
I cannot see any way of evaluating the welfare effects of financial
trading, and in particular informed trading. The social benefits
(how do more informative prices improve the allocation of real
resources) are impossible to quantify: they are often difficult even
to identify, except in the most general way (capital allocation is
improved). Unlike the trade for most goods and services, there is
no reason to believe that social and private benefits align.
Craig Pirrong, Pinging: Who Is the Predator, and Who Is the Prey?,
STREETWISE PROFESSOR BLOG (Apr. 5, 2014),
http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=8340.
364. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Tapping the Brakes: Are Less Active
Markets Safer and Better for the Economy? 23 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta,
Apr. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.frbatlanta.org
/news/conferences/2014/140415-fmc/agenda.aspx (surveying issues of
excessively active markets).
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B. THE ULTIMATUM GAME, RECIPROCITY, AND THE DUTCH
BOOK
Modern stock markets present a highly unusual context for
ethical analysis. On a scale representing the degree of
interpersonal interaction they are at an extreme, even when
compared to other arms-length bargaining contexts such as
corporate transactions, commercial sales, or employment
negotiations.365 Stock markets present an environment devoid
of face-to-face contact between counterparties, an important
contextual factor in moral analysis that has also had important
legal significance.366 Stock markets dominated by algorithmic
365. See, e.g., MacKenzie, supra note 6, at 58 (Algorithmic markets in
which most actors are themselves algorithms are the most depersonalized of
current market forms.). At the beginning of his study MacKenzie
distinguishes between three types of markets:
1. Market actors are all human beings, and the market involves
direct interaction among human beings. 2. The market is an
algorithm, but the actors remain mostly human beings; they
interact with the market via computer screen, keyboard and
mouse. 3. The market is an algorithm, and most actors in it are
also algorithms.
Id. at 3. In the economic sociology literature, Mark Granovetter emphasizes
the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or networks) of such
relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. Mark
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985). He argues further that the
anonymous market of neoclassical models is virtually nonexistent in economic
life and that transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections
described. Id. at 495; see also Wayne E. Baker, The Social Structure of a
National Securities Market, 89 AM. J. SOC. 775, 807 (1984) (explaining that
computerized trading may affect the social structure of the market, but it
would never escape the fact that markets are socially structured). While this
Article argues that the contemporary, computerized equity markets represent
an extreme type of market that in some ways approaches the anonymous and
abstract market of neoclassical theory, the fact that HFT is controversial at all
demonstrates that we still bring our moral beliefs to questions surrounding
the functioning of the algorithms and computer servers that constitute this
market.
366. Whether a transaction was conducted face-to-face or on an anonymous
exchange was often determinative under the early twentieth century state law
governing insider trading. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. OHagan:
Agency Law and Justice Powells Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78
B.U. L. REV. 13, 2226 (1998); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and
Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 78 (Feb. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261277; see also Elinor
Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 137, 140 (2000) (highlighting the importance of face-to-face
communication in public goods games).
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trading take this aspect to its extreme, where traders in the
conventional sense really just represent algorithms.367 Yet as
the outcry over HFT shows, even in this highly attenuated
context many individuals still feel moral principles do, or
should, apply.
Because of this unusual social context, any ethics of the
financial markets will inevitably be spare. We understand that
our potential trading partners on an exchange are wholly
motivated by self-interest in transacting with us, and there will
be no ongoing relationship beyond a single sale.368 Unlike other
business relationships, there is no reliance on another party
concerning future behavior. Nevertheless, there is a set of
minimal expectations, and thus a limited form of trust,
surrounding a one-time transaction in the anonymous,
mediated trading environment of the modern stock exchange.
The results of the Ultimatum Game as presented by
behavioral economist Richard Thaler are an appropriate
starting point.369 In the Ultimatum Game an individual, the
Allocator, is given a sum of money and told to divide it between
himself and the Recipient. 370 The Recipient then decides
whether to accept this allocation.371 If he does, both parties
receive the amounts as determined by the Allocator; if the
Recipient rejects the proposed allocation, both receive
nothing.372 According to the view of rationality espoused by
conventional economic theory, Recipients should accept any
offers greater than zero, and the offers proposed by Allocators
should approach zero.373
The results of experimental testing diverge considerably
from this view. Both Allocators and Recipients demonstrate a
preference towards divisions approaching a 50/50 split, which
Thaler interprets as demonstrating that notions of fairness
can play a significant role in determining the outcomes of
negotiations.374 In an Ultimatum Game conducted by German
367. MacKenzie, supra note 6, at 58.
368. See generally Joel Sobel, Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity,
43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 392, 41112 (2005) (discussing Repeated Games).
369. Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 195 (1988).
370. Id. at 195.
371. Id. at 19596.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 196 (citing Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a
Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982)).
374. Id. at 205.
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economists Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd
Schwarze, 21 pairs divided a sum c, between 4 and 10
Deutschmarks, with a mean offer of .37c.375 In 7 out of 21 cases
the offer was a 50/50 split. 376 In a further experiment
conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, Allocators were
presented with the choice of dividing $20 with Recipients in
either an 18/2 or a 10/10 split; 76% of the subjects divided the
$20 evenly.377
The Ultimatum Game indicates that humans gauge what
is appropriate in a transaction on some basis other than a
narrowly defined rationality alone. If rationality is defined as
the maximization of utility under a budget constraint,378 a
rational Recipient would accept any offer, no matter how small,
made by an Allocator. Likewise, Allocators would offer amounts
as small as possible in order to retain the maximum amount for
themselves. Yet such extreme self-interest does not comport
with the results of the Ultimatum Game. Human behavior lies
somewhere between the extremes of complete generosity and
complete greed, as Thaler observes.379 Most importantly, our
inherent greediness is tempered by the notion of fairness both
as Allocators and Recipients.380
375. Id. at 19697 (citing Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bern
Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982)).
376. Id. at 197.
377. Id. at 198.
378. See Kolb, supra note 299, at 24 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality
of Self and Others in an Economic System, 59 J. BUS. S385, S388 (1986)) (Key
Assumptions in Finance: Rationality and Self-Interest); see also Dobson,
supra note 299, at 4749 (The Axioms of Rationality); Nien-hê Hsieh,
Efficiency and Rationality, in FINANCE ETHICS, supra note 299, at 63.
379. See Thaler, supra note 369, at 205 ([I]t is safe to say that most people
are not well described by either extreme view. Rather, most people prefer
more money to less, like to be treated fairly, and like to treat others fairly.).
380. Evolutionary psychologists posit that the tendency to incorporate a
concept of fairness into strategic negotiation behavior, which both departs
from strict rationality and is grounded in reciprocity, promoted survival in the
environment of evolutionary adaptation. See John Tooby, Leda Cosmides &
Michael E. Price, Cognitive Adaptations for n-Person Exchange: The
Evolutionary Roots of Organizational Behavior, 27 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. 103, 118 (2006). Reciprocity would therefore be a superior survival
strategy to greed in environments characterized by significant uncertainty,
where bonds of trust between members of a group could mean the difference
between survival and extinction. For the presentation of these ideas in the
language of economics, see Sobel, supra note 368, at 397412. Cf. Armen A.
Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211,
211 (1950) (discussing the insufficiency of the typical rational economic theory
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The Ultimatum Game points towards reciprocity as a
grounding principle of our moral beliefs concerning
exchange. 381 The deviation from rationality observed in the
Ultimatum Game results in Allocators giving more than would
seem necessary, or rational, and Recipients demanding more
than a minimal amount. While not all Allocators split their
sums evenly, a surprising portion of them do. The movement
towards an equal division implies that we conceive fairness on
the basis of putting ourselves in a counterpartys shoeswe
ask, what would we hope for if we were in the other persons
position? An even 50/50 split would be the ideal reflection of the
others interests in this case.
The principle of reciprocity is reflected in many of the
worlds major ethical and religious traditions. Aristotles
treatment of exchange as proportionate equality captures
this,382 as does the Golden Rule of the New Testament, Do to
others as you would have them do to you. 383 The
intersubjectivity implicit in Kants Categorical Imperative
captures the notion of reciprocity as well. In commanding that
one ought never act except in such a way that I will also that
[my] maxim should become a universal law, the Categorical
Imperative places the self on the same plane as its fellow
humans.384 Indeed, Kants notion of the Kingdom of Ends takes
of predictable, individual behavior, and the need to incorporate ideas of
uncertainty and environmental adoption in economic models).
381. See generally Johnson, supra note 299, at 43. While Johnson grounds
his claims in what he terms pragmatic philosophy, which is in turn based on
Aristotles ethics, what follows in Part III is based on Kantian deontology. Id.
While Johnson discusses and rejects the philosophy of Rawls as a possible
basis for his theory that reciprocity is the foundation of financial economics, on
the grounds that Rawls believed that his conception of justice was political
not metaphysical, he does not explore Kantian deontology as a basis for
reciprocity. Id. at 45.
382. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 8891 (Albert Keith
Whitaker ed., Joe Sachs trans., Focus Publishing 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
Johnson bases his discussion of reciprocity on Aristotles conception of justice
in associations for exchange. See Johnson, supra note 299, at 48. Aristotle
believed that a fair exchange was characterized by proportionate equality, so
that there was no giving in exchange. See Lindsay Judson, Aristotle on Fair
Exchange, in 15 OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 147, 14751
(C.C.W. Taylor ed., 1997).
383. LUKE 6:31 (New International Version); see also MATTHEW 7:12 (New
International Version) (So in everything, do to others what you would have
them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.).
384. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 19 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785). The
first presentation of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork is commonly
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this to its conclusion, as we are to treat all persons as ends in
themselves, not means. 385 While Kant is clear that the
Categorical Imperative is not synonymous with the Golden
Rule,386 both ask us to place ourselves in the position of others
when exercising moral judgment.
Reciprocity as a fundamental principle of ethics has
important implications for finance.387 First, it means that we
should not act in a way that we would wish others not act
towards us.388 While this might appear at first glance to rule
out the overwhelming majority of market transactions, which
are of course based on self-interest, this is not really the
case.389 As Aristotles discussion of proportionate equality in
exchange makes clear, a fair exchange occurs when a party
exchanges something of equal value for something else.390 This
allows for parties to trade when they have differing needs. For
example, if I sell a loaf of bread for two dollars, I may do so
because I have three loaves already and cannot eat them all. It
also crucially allows for individuals to trade on the basis of
differing beliefs about future events.391 If I believe the country
referred to as the Formula of the Universal Law of Nature by philosophers.
See, e.g., Robert Johnson, Kants Moral Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ (last modified Apr. 6,
2008).
385. KANT, supra note 384, at 4546.
386. Id. at 48. Kant here states that the principle quod tibi non vis fieri [do
not do to others what you do not want done to yourself]
is only derived from that principle . . . it cannot be a universal law,
for it does not contain the ground of duties toward oneself, nor that
of the duties of love toward others (for many would gladly
acquiesce that others should not be bene!cent to him, if only he
might be relieved from showing bene!cence to them), or !nally of
owed duties to one another, for the criminal would argue on this
ground against the judge who punishes him, etc.
Id. For a detailed exposition of the relation between Kants Categorical
Imperative and the Golden Rule, see Daniel Berthold, The Golden Rule in
Kant and Utilitarianism, in THE GOLDEN RULE: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES
83 (Jacob Neusner & Bruce Chilton eds., 2009).
387. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 299, at 43.
388. See id. at 55.
389. See BOATRIGHT, supra note 299, at 1 ([A] moments reflection reveals
that finance would be impossible without ethics.).
390. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 382, at 8891.
391. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. I, ch. 11 (Trevor J. Saunders
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 350 B.C.E.). After he was reproached for
his poverty, Thales put a deposit down on all the olive presses on the Greek
islands of Chios and Miletus, knowing that the coming year would bring a
large olive crop. Id. at 1258. When the crop came in, he was able to rent out
the olive presses at a high price, earning a substantial amount. Id. at 1259.
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will enter a period of drought, I may be willing to pay ten
dollars for a portion of grain, and if my counterparty believes
rainfall will be good this year he may want to sell to me at this
price. Reciprocity does not mean that one wont trade on the
basis of comparative advantage or differing beliefs about the
future, or even differing levels of information, but merely that
one can envision making the trade on the given terms if one
were on the opposite side of the transaction.
Reciprocity does, however, conflict with trading practices
generally considered abusive. For example, insider trading
violates the principle of reciprocity, as we instinctively feel we
would not want to trade with someone who had information
about a security that was, in principle, only available to a
few.392 Likewise we feel that front-running on the part of our
broker is unfair, as it negatively affects the price we receive for
a stock, if only by a small amount.393 Both of these activities
strike most of us as fundamentally unfair. Still, it must be
remembered that reciprocity is a moral ideal: we hope it will be
respected when we act in the marketplace, even though we
know it sometimes is not, and we succumb on occasion to the
temptation to treat others as we would not want to be treated.
Reciprocity fundamentally represents an equality between
the two sides of an exchange. One interesting violation of
reciprocity is the Dutch Book. 394 This is when the
probabilities in a betting game add up to more or less than
one.395 If the probabilities are less than one, a gambler can
make a certain profit against the house; if more than one, the
While Aristotle relates this story for the purpose of illustrating how a
monopoly can be profitable, there is no hint that what Thales did was immoral
or shameful, even though Aristotle believes that the pursuit of wealth is
inferior to philosophy. Id.
392. See Steven McNamara, Insider Trading and Evolutionary Psychology:
Strong Reciprocity, Cheater Detection, and the Expanding Boundaries of the
Law, 22 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 241, 244 (2015) (noting that we intuitively feel
that [insider trading] is unfair and examining the relationship between this
social understanding and the law).
393. See id. ([W]e still bring our moral intuitions to the contemporary
environment of complex technological and financial systems.).
394. See Johnson, supra note 299, at 55. The Dutch Book argument was
presented by the mathematician Bruno de Finetti in 1931. See Klaus Heilig,
Carnap and de Finetti on Bets and the Probability of Singular Events: The
Dutch Book Argument Reconsidered, 29 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 325, 32627 (1978);
see also William M. Briggs, Dutch Book: Or, How to Gamble, W. M. BRIGGS
BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012), wmbriggs.com/?s=dutch+book (providing examples of
the Dutch Book).
395. See Briggs, supra note 394.
140 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
house will always come out ahead. 396 In the conventional
situation where a casino, lottery agency, pari-mutuel betting
operation, or Mafia numbers racket makes a Dutch Book, the
house in effect pays itself through the lopsided odds.397 Such an
amount is known as the skim, juice, vigorish, or vig.398 It
may be that this amount of guaranteed profit to the house is
just the cost of gambling, and that gamblers consent to paying
it because it is understood that in the long run the house
always wins.399
Query, however, whether such an understanding obtains
for transacting in the stock market. Do we believe that in the
long run, our investments will always lose or, more precisely,
that they will always be compromised by some small amount?
Equally important, do we feel that it is a violation of the
principle of reciprocity if there are such small amounts by
which we invariably lose, as a sort of tax or rent on our
transactions, and we do not know beforehand of either their
existence or extent? One of the fundamental criticisms of HFT
is that it exacts a small and hidden cost on all other traders in
the markets. 400 If so, HFT resembles a Dutch Book. The
analogy may be imperfect, but a casino and a successful HFT
firm both generate (relatively) riskless profits.401
396. Id. Consider the following example given by William Briggs: A bookie
gives even odds, or 1:1, for the Event occurring, and odds of 3:1 for the Non-
event occurring. Here the probabilities sum to 0.75 (0.50 for the Event plus
0.25 for the Non-event). A gambler can make a certain profit by
simultaneously wagering $20 on the Event and $10 on the Non-event. Should
the Event come to pass, the gambler will receive a payout of $40, comprised of
the original $20 wagered plus another $20. In the alternative, the Non-Event
comes to pass and the gambler receives a payout of $40, comprised of the
original $10 plus another $30. The gambler wagers a total of $30 and in either
case receives $40 because the probabilities sum to less than 1. Where the
probabilities sum to greater than 1, the house always wins. See id.
397. See, e.g., id. (explaining how American Roulette is a Dutch Book for
the casino).
398. See id.
399. See id. (stating that the amount skimmed may also be referred to as a
transaction cost).
400. See, e.g., ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 131, at 47 (Explicitly your
transaction costs may have come down . . . . Implicitly, you pay more for the
stocks you buy or you receive less from those you sell.).
401. See Briggs, supra note 394 (describing the riskless profits generated
by a Dutch Book); see also sources cited supra note 8 (describing how some
HFTs experience virtually no losses).
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C. FREEDOM FROMMISREPRESENTATION
The principle of reciprocity serves as a foundation for three
more particular ethical principles that will apply in the specific
environment of the financial markets. First among these is
freedom from misrepresentation.402 We do not want to be lied to
about the particulars of a specific security or about a particular
state of affairs in the markets.
Freedom from misrepresentation is a cornerstone of
market regulation and forms the basis of American securities
law.403 At base, market participants want some assurance that
they can rely on the information communicated to them.
Examples of this include the disclosure required by securities
regulation, as well as more short-lived aspects relating to
prices. 404 Can we assume that a quote posted is actually
available to be acted upon? Since HFT has transformed the
basic unit of market information from the trade to the order,405
quotes themselves are now the primary items of information in
the high frequency markets, and there is substantial concern
about their reliability.406 An estimated 96%98% of quotes are
now cancelled before they can be filled.407 The environment of
flickering, constantly revised quotations calls into question
some of the basic assumptions of securities markets, but it does
402. Freedom from misrepresentation is a focus of the business ethics
literature dealing with the financial markets. See, e.g., BOATRIGHT, supra note
299, at 17577 (Fraud and manipulation); Shefrin & Statman, supra note
299, at 25.
403. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of
1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 3435 (1959); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of
Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation by
Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 53435 (1999).
404. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 299, at 24.
405. OHara, supra note 148, at 263 (Algorithmic trading means that
trades are not the basic unit of market information  the underlying orders
are.).
406. The inability of Haim Bodek to execute trades at the prices offered
formed the impetus for his quest to understand the new trading environment.
See PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 5457. Maureen OHara reports that, by
some estimates, upwards of 98% of quotes are cancelled, creating uncertainty
as to the actual level of current prices. OHara, supra note 148, at 259, 267;
see also Joel Hasbrouck, High Frequency Quoting: Short-Term Volatility in
Bids and Offers 4 (Jan. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2237499 (examining the relationship between short-term volatility
in bids and high frequency quoting).
407. See OHara, supra note 148, at 259 ([I]t is now common for upward of
98% of all orders to be canceled instead of being executed as trades.); Gai et
al., supra note 254, at 6 ([A]n increase in trading speeds leads to a dramatic
increase in the cancellation/execution ratio from 26:1 to 32:1 . . . .).
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not necessarily indicate a violation of the principle of freedom
from misrepresentation. There seems to be nothing wrong in
principle with cancelling an order, even if it leads to a vast
majority of orders being cancelled. A consequence of the
marked increase in the order-to-cancellation ratio, however, is
that traders can no longer rely on the assumption that a quote
represents shares actually available to be bought or sold.408
On the other hand, there are numerous abuses in the high
frequency arena that do amount to a violation of the principle
of freedom from misrepresentation. As seen above, the
momentum ignition strategies of spoofing and layering are in
essence contemporary forms of stock market manipulation.409
These are part of the cat and mouse game of dueling
algorithms, but they also involve the misuse of a quote that
amounts to an implicit misrepresentation. If we post a quote
that indicates that we are willing to buy something with the
intent of changing the price, and then turn around and sell it,
the original quote misrepresents our intent.410 Of course, we
could say the same about posting a quote and then cancelling
it, but momentum ignition strategies take this one step further.
In the context of spoofing and layering, a quote is posted with
the intent of causing it to change the prices prevailing in the
markets, and then another quote is acted on to the detriment of
others responding to the change. Not surprisingly, these
activities have been targeted with the laws proscribing market
manipulation.411
The belief in public protection from misrepresentation is a
cornerstone of securities law, and business law in general, yet
its application presents serious difficulties in the HFT world.412
This is because we want to continue to rely on signals that we
408. See OHara, supra note 148, at 267; Gai et al., supra note 254, at 56.
409. See supra notes 24959 and accompanying text (discussing
momentum ignition and spoofing).
410. See Pasquale, supra note 12, at 210612 (Responding to
Misrepresentation of Market Conditions).
411. See Aktas, supra note 252, at 9394 (discussing market
manipulation); Scopino, supra note 12, at 66063 (Spoofing as Violating
Commodity Exchange Act Sections 4c(a)(2)(B) and 9(a)(2)); see, e.g., Kirilenko
& Lo, supra note 125, at 66 (SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against an
investment firm using spoofing and layering techniques to manipulate
prices); Korsmo, supra note 12, at 55455 (Trillium Brokerage Servs., LLC
was fined $2 million for utilizing a momentum ignition strategy).
412. See generally Tara E. Levens, Note, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-
Frequency Trading and Securities Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511
(2015).
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have always assumed were reliablefor example, that quotes
posted are in fact open to be filledbut for reasons of
technological advance may no longer be so. 413 Part of the
consternation traders such as Haim Bodek have felt stems from
an implicit feeling of deception in the markets, that quotes
posted are not in fact available to be filled but are merely there
to induce other behavior from other traders.414 Freedom from
fraud and misrepresentation are just as much preconditions of
computerized markets as they were of earlier ones. Increased
enforcement of the existing law concerning market
manipulation against deceptive use of quotations is required to
police such behavior.
D. A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
One of the most frequent complaints of HFT is that it
creates a two-tiered system in which a small amount of players
have preferential treatment or are otherwise advantaged.415
This criticism assumes that somehow the securities markets
are, or should be, a level playing field.
The notion of a level playing field in financial law means
that like market participants will be treated alike. 416 In
securities markets this means that with the necessary
prerequisitesthe required investments of time and material
resourcesanyone should be able to compete successfully in
413. See, e.g., id. at 151112.
414. Bodek, HFT Checkmate, supra note 265.
415. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3605 (Jan. 14, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
242).
416. See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 46062
(2003) (characterizing the disclose or abstain rule of insider trading law as
an attempt to level the playing field); Zachary J. Gubler, Reconsidering the
Institutional Design of Federal Securities Regulation, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
409, 42426 (2014) (characterizing the disclosure regime of the Exchange Act
as an attempt to level the playing field for exchange-listed firms); see also
Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon
Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 699700 (2003) (noting the creation of a
level playing field under Delaware corporate law for bidders in corporate
auctions). For discussions of a level playing field in the law itself, see Sec.
Exch. Commn v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968)
(reiterating congressional intent that all members of the investing public
should be subject to identical market risks); Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240) ([I]nvestors lose confidence in the fairness of the markets when they
know that other participants may exploit unerodable informational
advantages . . . .).
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the securities markets, and that these prerequisites should be
available to all.417 Of course, in reality not all market players
will make these investments, and more fundamentally, these
prerequisites may not be available to all.418 A level playing field
exists more as a goal or ideal than as a concrete reality.419 An
example of this comes from the law of insider trading. One of
the motivations of insider trading law is to prevent individuals
from trading on the basis of information that is in principle not
available to all, because this is thought to be unfair.420 No one
presumes that traders in fact trade on equal information, but
the law doesto some degree at leastaim to restrict trading
on information that is not accessible to all.421 Equal access to
information is key to what a level playing field means in U.S.
securities law generally.422 In the HFT arena a level playing
field also implicates issues of speed and processing power, and
equal treatment by the law and key market institutions.423
The race for speed and co-location call into question the
notion of a level playing field because the small advantages
that accrue to HFT can never be made up by other traders. In
the zero-sum game of trading, traders with speed advantages
will always win the competition to come in first, as others can
never make up for any initial delay.424 Since trading in the
current markets often reduces to a mere competition for speed,
417. See Shefrin & Statman, supra note 299, at 28 (The idea of the level
playing field is associated with the view that investment activity is a game of
skill.).
418. See supra notes 18890 (describing the large investments necessary to
compete in HFT).
419. See United States v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (Although
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on
misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.).
420. Of course in American securities law, trading on nonpublic
information is not, in principle, enough to result in an insider trading
violation; access to such information must also involve the violation of a
fiduciary duty. OHagan, 521 U.S. at 647. For perceptions of unfairness on
trading in a wide variety of scenarios, see Stuart P. Green & Matthew B.
Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public
Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 445 (2011).
421. See OHagan, 521 U.S. at 65867 (detailing the purpose and previous
court interpretations of the misappropriation theory).
422. See Gubler, supra note 416, at 42426 (arguing that one of the
principles that motivated Congress to enact securities laws is a concern for
fairness and a level playing field).
423. Levens, supra note 412, at 1512.
424. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
2016] HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 145
slower traders feel that they cannot hope to compete with co-
located traders for the best trades, leading to the belief that
there is a two-tiered market.425
A level playing field is a concept that represents an ideal,
not a real, condition. 426 Even where the law is relatively
successful in creating a level playing field, in reality there is
significant asymmetric information in markets. 427 Much,
though not all, of this is the result of varying investments in
human capital, technology, research, and analysis. 428 And
behind these differences sit our different human endowments,
which result in varying levels of ambition, intelligence, and
interests that in turn contribute to varying levels of material
success. That said, the concept of fairness in the financial
markets requires that regulators strive to keep access to
information and the inherent ability to profit from it open to
all.429 While in theory all may have the opportunity to use this
information, in practice HFT calls into question the notion of a
level playing field by restricting the ability to profit from it to
only the very most sophisticated actors.430
E. INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
The final basic principle of a financial markets ethics for
HFT is the presumption of institutional integrity. A number of
the practices outlined above implicate questions of the integrity
of the institutions central to the financial markets. Primary
among these are the stock exchanges, but the practices of dark
pools and broker-dealers have also come under fire as unfair to
certain of their customers. Before we examine these charges,
however, it is useful to define institutional integrity.431
425. A level playing field also implicates the (un)equal treatment of
different classes of traders by key market institutions, primarily the
exchanges and other trading venues. Since this relates to business decisions
made by these institutions, they are treated in infra Section III.E.
426. See OHagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
427. See Subramanian, supra note 416, at 694 (noting that information
will not be widely distributed because information costs are high).
428. See id.; Levens, supra note 412, at 1511.
429. See Coffee, supra note 86 (To this point, we have been ducking the
larger issue and focusing only on whether Regulation NMS was violated. But
should co-location and private data feeds from exchanges to preferred
shareholders be permissible?).
430. Bodek, HFT Checkmate, supra note 265.
431. Institutional integrity has received substantial discussion in the
business ethics literature. See, e.g., Thomas Maak, Undivided Corporate
Responsibility: Towards a Theory of Corporate Integrity, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS 353
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At the core of institutional integrity is the idea that an
institution displays integrity when it acts in the furtherance of
its prior commitments to stakeholders. 432 While honesty is
important to integrity, the two concepts are not synonymous.433
Integrity denotes the will to honor obligations in a way that
demonstrates a coherence of the actions and commitments of
the institution in question both through time and across the
range of the institutions obligations to its various
stakeholders.434 At base institutional integrity means living up
to an institutions commitments.435 An important sub-question
asks how we know an institution has made a commitment to a
particular stakeholder. Many of these commitments or
obligations arise naturally in the course of business and are
implicit rather than explicit.436 While there may be substantial
room for disagreement as to identifying particular
commitments, it is important to recognize that they can arise
implicitly in the course of business. Such implicit commitments
form a legitimate basis for many of the complaints found in the
HFT debate as well as in wider questions of business ethics.
Problems at the stock exchanges are not new, but the
conjunction of Regulation NMS and rapid technological change
transformed the exchanges. They went from being relatively
transparent entities that privileged members at the expense of
retail clients, to opaque ones privileging one set of clients at the
expense of others.437 The temptation of catering to HFT in the
(2008); Lynne McFall, Integrity, 98 ETHICS 5 (1987); Lynn Sharp Paine,
Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.Apr. 1994, at
106.
432. SeeMaak, supra note 431, at 358.
433. SeeMcFall, supra note 431, at 78.
434. SeeMaak, supra note 431, at 364; McFall, supra note 431, at 79.
435. SeeMaak, supra note 431, at 362.
436. See Ronald Jeurissen, The Social Function of Business Ethics, 10 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 821, 823 (2000) (characterizing the social contract model of
business ethics as an implicit social contract); cf. Anita Jose & Mary S.
Thibodeaux, The Institutionalization of Ethics: The Perspectives of Managers,
22 J. BUS. ETHICS 133, 135 (1999) (discussing implicit forms of ethics in
organizations). For an analogous argument in the legal literature, see Lon. L.
Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1969) (arguing
customary law originates in reciprocal expectations); Gerald Postema, Implicit
Law, 13 L. & PHIL. 361, 362 (1994) (Implicit Rules and Social Interaction).
437. This contrast is the fulcrum point of Craig Pirrongs Pick Your Poison,
which emphasizes the ability of the exchanges to profit from natural trading
monopolies prior to the introduction of Reg. NMSs Order Handling Rule,
which effectively socialized order flow. Pirrong, Pick Your Poison, supra note
70, at 11.
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new and highly competitive environmentwhere revenue
comes from the spread between maker and taker fees
compromised the institutional integrity of the exchanges.438 In
the race to capture a viable flow of orders, exchanges were
incentivized to cater to their best customers, the HFT shops.439
While the maker/taker pricing system is a large factor in the
competition for order flow, perhaps equally important to HFT
clients is the nature of the order flow on an exchange with
many institutional and retail clients: it is generally not well
informed, i.e., not toxic. This uninformed order flow holds
great appeal for HFT, and the exchanges have offered HFT
clients a number of tools to profit from trading with it.
The various techniques reviewed in Part II can all be seen
as mechanisms that facilitate HFTs mission to profit from
slower and less informed traders.440 One of the most trenchant
criticisms of HFT is that the exchanges engineered these
techniques specifically to allow HFT firms to profit at the
expense of their other customers. 441 The fees garnered for
facilitating HFT activity can therefore be seen as the
exchanges cut of the profits. 442 The compromised
institutional integrity of the exchanges consists of offering up
one group of customers as prey to another, more lucrative
group. A commitment to institutional integrity would entail
resisting the temptation to profit at their slower customers
expense by refusing to facilitate the abusive forms of HFT.
While defenders of HFT and the exchanges may argue whether
such a strategy would even be feasible in an environment
where the bulk of trading is accomplished algorithmically and
the maker/taker system predominates, at least one trading
venue is currently testing this proposition in the market.443
438. See supra notes 14850 and accompanying text (describing the
maker/taker payment system).
439. Cf. supra notes 18990 and accompanying text (exchanges as deriving
substantial revenue from the sale of data to HTFs).
440. A few of the techniques discussed above are co-location, flash orders,
spoofing, layering, quote-stuffing, and ISOs. See supra Part II.
441. See, e.g., Bodek, HFT Checkmate, supra note 265; Hope, supra note
282 (noting the BATS exchange was fined $14 million to settle claims that it,
among other things, gave some high-speed traders an advantage over others
by not providing details about certain order types).
442. Cf. Fox et al., supra note 12, at 233 (If electronic front running were
eliminated tomorrow, HFT co-location facilities would be worth less to the
HFTs . . . . This might reduce the rents collected by the exchanges.).
443. See Karl Antle, IEX & the Re-Mutualization of Market Infrastructure,
WALL ST. & TECH. (May 28, 2014), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com
148 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
IEX stands as an important test of whether the trading
environment will support a trading venue that markets itself to
traders, in large part, on ethical grounds.444 While it has only
been in operation since October 2013, 445 it has enjoyed a
successful launch.446
In addition to the exchanges, at least one dark pool has
allegedly been tempted to misrepresent itself to clients in a bid
to profit from HFT. 447 Dark pools are often seen as more
favorable to institutional and retail traders than lit exchanges
because no quotes are posted before trades are made and the
HFT firms are therefore deprived of a key element of the
information needed to trade ahead of slower investors. 448
Conversely, HFT practitioners find dark pools a lucrative
environment due to the slowness and relatively uninformed
nature of the average institution seeking to trade there. 449
According to New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman,
Barclays claimed it prevented HFT firms from trading in its
dark pool, Barclays LX, while simultaneously and covertly
/infrastructure/iex-and-the-re-mutualization-of-market-infrastructure/a/d-
id/1252879.
444. See generally id. (describing the structure and support of IEX).
445. IEX Announces: Production Launch Friday, October 25th, 2013 as a
Non-Displayed ATS, IEX (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.iextrading.com/trading/alerts/2013/001/.
446. IEX now accounts for 0.80.9% of the daily stock trading volume, and
is raising funds to become a registered exchange. See Michael J. De la Merced,
Lower-Frequency Platform Raises Funding to Become Full Stock Market, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 2, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/iex-
upstart-trading-platform-raises-75-million-in-new-financing/.
447. See Keri Geiger, Sam Mamudi & Chris Dolmetsch, Dark Pool Greed
Drove Barclays to Lie to Clients, N.Y. Says, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESS (June 25,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-25/barclays-dark-
pools-said-to-face-suit-from-n-y-attorney-general; Scott Patterson & Bradley
Hope, Barclays Dark Pool Drew Early Alarms, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2014,
7:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/barclays-dark-pool-drew-early-alarms-
on-fast-trading-1405898592. Also relevant is the SECs $2 million fine of dark
pool Liquidnet for disclosing information concerning traders to issuers whose
stock was traded on its dark pool; such disclosure violates Regulation ATS
Rule 301(b)(10). Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commn, SEC Charges New
York-Based Dark Pool Operator with Failing to Safeguard Confidential
Trading Information (June 6, 2014), http://www.sec.gov
/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542011574; see also William
Alden, Liquidnet, a Dark Pool Operator, Is Fined $2 Million over Customer
Data, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 6, 2014),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/liquidnet-a-dark-pool-operator-is-
fined-2-million-over-customer-data/?_r=0.
448. See SHORTER &MILLER, supra note 126, at 5.
449. See Geiger et al., supra note 447.
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marketing itself to HFT firms. 450 The misrepresentation
allegedly consisted of providing false numbers for the estimated
amount of trading done by HFT firms under Barclays
liquidity profiling metric. 451 If the allegations in Attorney
General Schneidermans complaint are true, Barclays
comprised its institutional integrity in an attempt to profit in
the competitive world of dark pools.
Broker-dealers are the final group of market actors who
may have succumbed to the temptation to profit at the expense
of their clients. The maker/taker payment system appears to
incentivize brokers to route their clients limit orders to the
trading venue that offers the highest liquidity rebate, rather
than the one offering the best likelihood of execution.452 Since
most brokers charge clients fixed commissions, while the
exchanges offer various levels of rebates in the maker/taker
pricing system, it may be profit maximizing for brokers to
consider liquidity rebates rather than the probability of limit
order execution when making routing decisions.453 As a result,
the current market structure appears to incentivize broker-
dealers to violate their duty of best execution for clients.454
Along with the exchanges and dark pools, the current trading
450. See Complaint at 24, People v. Barclays Capital Inc., 1 N.Y.S.3d 910
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (Index No. 451391/2014). Unlike the consolidated
litigations In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig.,
No. 14-MD-2589 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113323, at *81 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2015), and Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 353, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2015), Attorney General Schneidermans suit survived a motion to dismiss.
People v. Barclays Capital Inc., 1 N.Y.S.3d 910, 917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
451. See Sam Mamudi & Doni Bloomfield, Cracks Open in Dark Pool
Defense with Barclays Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESS (June 26, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-26/cracks-open-in-dark-pool-
defense-with-schneiderman-barclays-suit.
452. See Robert H. Battalio, Shane A. Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can
Brokers Have it All? On the Relation Between Make-Take Fees and Limit
Order Execution Quality 15 (Oct. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2367462; see also
BLACKROCK, US EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 7
(2014), http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/whitepaper
/viewpoint-us-equity-market-structure-april-2014.pdf.
453. Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed
Trading in U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Robert H. Battalio, Professor of Finance,
Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame).
454. See BLACKROCK, supra note 452, at 2.
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environment appears to offer incentives tempting broker-
dealers to compromise their institutional integrity.455
Like the other principles outlined above, institutional
integrity depends on the expectations of parties entering the
financial markets. When we enter the financial marketplace,
we do not expect that the venue on which we trade is complicit
in ordering us up as prey to another class of traders. Similarly,
we presume institutions are not lying when they make
representations to participants in the markets and that, at
some basic level, there is a level playing field. These
principles are the conditions of the possibility of456 financial
markets in general, and that is why critics of HFT ultimately
believe it has a serious effect on market confidence. While
market actors can violate these principles to some degree, in
order for financial markets to flourish to the greatest extent
possible, these principles, which are essentially moral, must be
respected.
CONCLUSION
The four principles outlined above are abstract and
essentially moral, but they also reflect bedrock principles of
American securities regulation. In mandating extensive
disclosure and policing the markets for fraud, insider trading,
and other abuses, American securities law goes significantly
beyond a caveat emptor approach.457 Since it is difficult to
draw useful estimates of costs and benefits in a system as
complicated as the current equity markets, the principles of
455. See id.
456. This mode of argument is modeled on Kants philosophical method.
Kant believed that the categories of human understanding functioned as the
a priori conditions of a possible experience in general which in turn allow us
to answer the questions: How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure
science of nature possible? IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 56,
138 (N. Kemp-Smith trans., St. Martins Press 1965) (c. 1781). Likewise, a
modicum of trust in the ethical principles outlined above seems a necessary
precondition for the possibility of financial markets. For a related argument
based on the intersection of Kants moral theory with economics, see Jean-
Jacques Laffont, Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics:
An Introduction to Kantian Economics, 42 ECONOMICA 430 (1975). This
Kantian mode of argument is also found in the law and economics literature.
See Pasquale, supra note 12, at 2117 (Law is constitutive of so-called financial
markets, not some mere side constraint on them.). Pasquales argument is
based on Pistors Legal Theory of Finance. Id. at 208789 (citing Katharina
Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315 (2013)).
457. See Gubler, supra note 416, at 41523.
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freedom from misrepresentation, a level playing field, and
institutional integrity should play a strong role in building a
regulatory strategy for HFT that best serves the goal of a
stable, healthy, and just economy. These principles ultimately
reflect a belief that financial markets transactions should
qualify as reciprocal exchange.
While equity concerns are often pushed to the background
in questions of financial regulation, where fundamental
uncertainty surrounds the operation of causes and effects in a
system as complex as the current financial markets, they are
particularly useful as ex ante regulatory guides. A set of ethical
principles can also function as a floor or minimum where a
cost-benefit analysis fails to adequately safeguard the interests
of individuals or groups of market actors, as is arguably the
case with HFT. Despite HFTs role in the market revolution
that has greatly lowered costs for most investors, the detailed
look at the objectionable HFT practices presented in Part II
illustrates that the interaction of various groups of financial
market stakeholders with HFT provides grounds for the
complaint that HFT is not fair.
A close look at HFT is also illuminating because it suggests
that the greatest challenge presented by HFT may be that it
undermines some of the implicit assumptions of Regulation
NMS. As Donald MacKenzie observes, Regulation NMS is
predicated upon a Newtonian world while HFT ushers in an
Einsteinian one.458 Regulation NMS makes sense if prices can
be transmitted instantaneously to the SIP, but the speed at
which HFT operates reveals gaps between different markets,
i.e., the servers used by the exchanges, which HFT exploits.
Regulation NMS was also formulated with little attention to
the radical shift underway in the business model of the
exchanges, and it seems to presume that exchanges could
continue to earn money in their traditional manner as they
competed with one another in a national market system. In
reality the adoption of maker/taker pricing systems forces
exchanges to compete with one another under a radically new
business model. If the exchanges are forced to compromise
their institutional integrity for the sake of their very survival
in the new trading environment, this poses the question of
whether there is a need for multiple trading venues in a world
where all exchanges are closely knit together into a digitized
458. SeeMacKenzie, supra note 6, at 4142.
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national market system. At the very least, the current travails
show that the disruptions brought about by the information
technology revolution require a new vision of an equitable
trading environment.
